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ARTICLES  
Workers’ Rights as Natural             
Human Rights 
ANNE MARIE LOFASO* 
We live in an increasingly polarized world: one summed 
up by President Clinton, “we’re all in this together;” the 
other summed up by then-presidential candidate Trump, “I 
alone can fix it.” These world views have implications for 
workers and how the future workplace is ordered. In this   
Article, I explore the idea that a natural human rights ap-
proach to workplace regulations will tend to favor the we’re-
all-in-this-together view, whereas the Lochnerian or neo-
liberal view tends to favor an individualistic world view.  
The Article’s six-step analytical approach starts with a 
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historical analysis of labor law jurisprudence, concluding 
that U.S. labor laws must be filtered through a law-and-eco-
nomic lens of U.S.-styled capitalism to predict the outcomes 
of legal disputes and to expose human rights infirmities in-
herent to that approach. In step two, I explore T.H. Mar-
shall’s account of citizenship, concluding that Marshall’s 
rights-based rubric is too limited to fully explain workers’ 
rights, which tend to cut across the full gamut of human 
rights. In step three, I expand upon Marshall’s work to build 
a framework for evaluating workplace laws based on the 
worker as a citizen of the labor force who has human rights. 
I do this using two methodologies: (1) comparative legal 
analysis between U.S. law and international human rights 
standards; and (2) jurisprudential analysis of fundamental 
values within a rights-based framework. In step four, I mod-
ify John Rawls’s famous thought experiment to include a veil 
of empathy. In that modified experiment, I conclude that par-
ticipants in the original position behind a veil of empathy 
would generate values underlying human rights, namely au-
tonomy (to become part author of one’s work life) and dig-
nity (to be treated as a person always as an end and never 
merely as a means). In step five, I apply this human rights 
approach to show that workers’ and employers’ interests 
conflict at the interests-level and, more fundamentally, at the 
values-level. I conclude that these conflicts are primarily 
over the distribution of that which labor and capital create.  
This distributional question is fundamental a question of 
moral and political justice, which will and does have real 
political consequences. In step six, I set forth a path along 
which this research project should explore. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
A. Two Visions of America 
There are two visions of America a half century from 
now. One is of a society more divided between the 
haves and the have-nots, a country in which the rich 
live in gated communities, send their children to ex-
pensive schools, and have access to first-rate medical 
care. Meanwhile, the rest live in a world marked by 
insecurity, at best mediocre education, and in effect 
rationed health care―they hope and pray they don’t 
get seriously sick. At the bottom are millions of 
young people alienated and without hope. I have seen 
that picture in many developing countries; econo-
mists have given it a name, a dual economy, two so-
cieties living side by side, but hardly knowing each 
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other, hardly imagining what life is like for the other. 
Whether we will fall to the depths of some countries, 
where the gates grow higher and the societies split 
farther and farther apart, I do not know. It is, how-
ever, the nightmare towards which we are slowly 
marching.1 
The capacity for Americans to live good lives necessarily de-
pends on their capacity to provide for themselves and their families. 
The good life entails meaningful access to education, health care, 
and good jobs in a secure environment. The vast majority of Amer-
icans identify as middle class, but nearly all of us are working class, 
in the sense that we must work in jobs to meet our basic needs. To 
disrupt the path toward cementing these two visions of the American 
future, this Article focuses on labor rights in helping to create a con-
text (together with other socioeconomic rights such as security, ed-
ucation, and health care access) that allows for self-actualization, 
thereby leading the way toward greater economic equality. 
One challenge to disrupting this path is neoliberal rhetoric. As 
one neoliberal standard bearer, U.S. Representative Paul Ryan, has 
said, “[A] renewed commitment to limited government will un-
shackle our economy and create millions of new jobs and opportu-
nities for all people, of every background, to succeed and prosper. 
Under this approach, the spirit of initiative —not political clout—
determines who succeeds.”2 Mitt Romney similarly declared: “Job 
and income growth can only come from a growing, successful pri-
vate sector . . . .A pro-job, pro-prosperity government works to cre-
ate the conditions that enable businesses of all sizes to grow and 
thrive.”3 While neoliberalism purports to augment liberty for all by 
limiting government interference in business affairs, as this Article 
                                                                                                             
 1 JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, THE PRICE OF INEQUALITY: HOW TODAY’S DIVIDED 
SOCIETY ENDANGERS OUR FUTURE 289 (2012). 
 2 CNN, CNN Live Event/Special: Republicans Respond to President Obama, 
TRANSCRIPTS (Jan. 25, 2011, 10:00 PM), http://www.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/
1101/25/se.03.html. See also Remarks to the Manhattan Institute in New York 
City, 2 PUB. PAPERS 1367–68 (Nov. 13, 2008). 
 3 Mitt Romney, Grow Jobs and Shrink Government, BOSTON GLOBE (Aug. 
18, 2010), http://archive.boston.com/bostonglobe/editorial_opinion/oped/arti-
cles/2010/08/18/grow_jobs_and_shrink_government/?camp=localsearch:on:twit
:rtbutton. 
2017] WORKERS' RIGHTS AS NATURAL HUMAN RIGHTS 571 
 
shows, free market policies coerce workers and restrict their liberty. 
For example, despite increasing evidence that black lung disease has 
been worsening, the coal industry blocked effective coal-dust regu-
lations until recently.4 Not only did the unregulated market stifle the 
liberty of coal miners who suffered from this heinous disease, it suc-
ceeded in snuffing out their lives.5 
B. Modern Workplace Fragmentation Has Resulted in a No-Duty-
Holder Problem 
The modern workplace has become increasingly fractured.6 This 
fragmentation has been occurring on many levels. On one level, the 
workplace has splintered geographically.7 Twentieth-century out-
sourcing8 of U.S. jobs began in the 1970s and 1980s in two ways. 
First, companies began to outsource non-core jobs that could be 
done with the help of computers, such as company payroll.9 Shortly 
thereafter, jobs such as billing, accounting, and word processing, 
which could also be executed with the help of computers, were also 
outsourced.10 Second, companies began to outsource manufacturing 
jobs, typically consumer electronic products, to geographic areas 
with both expertise and lower labor costs.11 By the 1990s, the U.S. 
witnessed offshore outsourcing, the outsourcing of jobs to foreign 
countries.12 As one scholar noted, however, offshore outsourcing 
                                                                                                             
 4 See Lowering Miners’ Exposure to Respirable Coal Mine Dust, 79 Fed. 
Reg. 24,814 (May 1, 2014). See generally Anne Marie Lofaso, What We Owe Our 
Coal Miners, 5 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 87, 90–91, 94–95, 101 (2011). 
 5 See id. at 89–95. 
 6 Fracturing is a different, albeit related, problem to subcontracting, which 
is beyond the scope of this paper. 
 7 This account does not include the movement of manufacturing from the 
northern to the southern states. This movement of capital complicates the picture 
but is beyond the scope of this paper. 
 8 By outsourcing, I mean giving jobs to those who are not company employ-
ees. 
 9 See generally Daniel W. Drezner, The Outsourcing Bogeyman, 83 
FOREIGN AFF. 22, 24 (2004). 
 10 See id. at 24–25. 
 11 See Rob Handfield, A Brief History of Outsourcing, N.C. STATE UNIV.: 
SUPPLY CHAIN RES. COOP. (June 1, 2006), https://scm.ncsu.edu/scm-articles/arti-
cle/a-brief-history-of-outsourcing. 
 12 For example, American Express established “back-office operations in In-
dia” in the early 1990s. See Drezner, supra note 9, at 25. 
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raised few concerns (except possibly among those personally af-
fected) because more jobs were created in the U.S. (especially in the 
high-end service sector) than were lost to foreign countries.13 He 
added, those jobs that 
will migrate offshore are predominantly those 
that . . . requir[e] low skill since process and repeat-
ability are key underpinnings of the work. Innovation 
and deep business expertise will continue to be de-
livered predominantly on shore.” Not coincidentally, 
these are also the tasks that generate high wages and 
large profits and drive the U.S. economy.14 
On another level, the workplace has splintered into the physical 
and digital spheres. When Ronald Reagan was president, there was 
literally one type of workplace – the physical space. Whether a fac-
tory floor, an office, a classroom, or the field, the workplace con-
sisted entirely of physical space. Today, there are all types of phys-
ical and virtual work spaces beyond the factory floor or the office 
building. Now there are telecommunication centers, alternative of-
fice spaces where employees can work to cut down on communi-
cating costs. There are also home offices, which are also used to cut 
down on commuting costs or to allow greater work-hour flexibility 
often desired to better balance work-family interests. And there are 
fully portable spaces that reside inside our portable computers—our 
laptops, electronic notebooks, iPads, smart phones, and other com-
pletely digitized work spaces. 
On a third level, the workplace has splintered in an ontological 
sense. Employers categorize or misclassify workers as employees or 
                                                                                                             
 13 See id. at 23, 25. This is an application of what free-trade proponents call 
comparative advantage, whereby trade occurs because each economic actor (in 
this case, each country) has a comparative advantage in producing a good or ser-
vice more efficiently or less expensively than other economic actors. See, e.g., F. 
W. Taussig, Wages and Prices in Relation to International Trade, 20 Q. J. ECON. 
497, 500 (1906). The originator of this theory is David Ricardo. See DAVID 
RICARDO, ON THE PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL ECONOMY AND TAXATION 108 (John 
B. Bell, 2d American ed. 1830) (1817). That theory was modified by Eli 
Heckscher and Bertil Ohlin resulting in the Heckscher-Ohlin Theorem. See 
BERTIL OHLIN, INTERREGIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE 316–17 (1933). 
 14 Drezner, supra note 9, at 26 (quoting an International Data Corporation 
analysis). 
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independent contractors by manipulating legal rules.15 For example, 
an employer may classify a worker as an independent contractor to 
minimize its tax liability or to circumvent its legal duties.16 
Workplace fragmentation means that many workers are no 
longer tied to a particular employer because of their status as virtual 
employees in a digital world or as independent contractors. Many 
workers have lost their statutory and other legal protections in the 
workplace simply because they do not fit the regulatory or common 
law definition of employee. In effect, there is no employer on which 
to place a legal duty. A human rights approach to workers’ rights 
could remedy this problem by ensuring that workers’ rights no 
longer attach to workers solely by imposing duties strictly on em-
ployers. 
C. A Progressive World View Could Categorize Workers’ Rights 
as Natural Human Rights and Would Serve Several Worker 
Interests 
The purpose of this Article is to put forth the progressive view 
that workers’ rights are natural human rights. By natural, I mean to 
suggest that these rights are grounded in particular moral values—
autonomy and dignity—and in the diminishment of human coercion. 
As well as remedying the no-duty-holder problem identified above, 
there are at least five additional reasons why it is important to 
demonstrate that workers’ rights are human rights. First, articulating 
workers’ rights as human rights expresses their fundamental im-
portance. For many, workers’ rights are merely positive rights17 that 
must be balanced against employers’ managerial and property inter-
ests. In capitalist states such as the U.S., the employer’s interests are 
often viewed as more significant.18 Were a capitalist country like the 
                                                                                                             
 15 See DEP’T FOR PROF’L EMPS. AFL-CIO, Misclassification of Employees as 
Independent Contractors (2016), http://dpeaflcio.org/wp-content/uploads/Mis-
classification-of-Employees-2016.pdf. 
 16 See id. 
 17 By positive rights, I mean rights granted by the state (e.g., statutes, regula-
tions) as opposed to natural rights. I do not mean positive human rights, which 
would oblige the state to take action, as opposed to negative human rights, which 
would oblige the state to refrain from taking action. 
 18 See, e.g., Lechmere, Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 502 U.S. 527, 533–35 (1992) (hold-
ing that employer’s property right to exclude trespasses always outweighs em-
ployees’ Section 7 rights to receive information about unionization except where 
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U.S. to accept that workers’ rights were human rights, those rights 
would be viewed as weightier, and balances in favor of employer 
interests would be harder to justify. Second, raising the status of 
workers’ rights to human rights places obligations on the state to 
respect, protect, and perhaps even actualize the fullness of those 
rights. Third, were workers’ rights treated as human rights, addi-
tional avenues of recourse would open. Trade unions have been the 
traditional institution for promoting the workers’ cause.19 By label-
ing workers’ rights as human rights, transgression of those rights 
may come under the mandate of certain nongovernmental organiza-
tions (NGOs). At the very least, transgression would garner more 
attention from NGOs and the media. Fourth, if workers’ rights were 
treated as human rights, the principle against retrogressive measures 
would apply.20 This means that once the state granted rights to em-
ployees, it could not diminish those rights without proper justifica-
tion. Fifth, a theory of workers’ rights as human rights provides an 
alternative model to the economic model for describing work law 
and workplaces.21 Economic and human rights models often clash 
at a values level. The human rights model makes these conflicts 
clear and, to some extent, resolvable. 
D. The Law and Economics Model for Work Law Serves as A 
Historical Foil for the Human Rights Model 
Part II puts forth the law and economics model for work law 
within its historical context. There, I describe and deconstruct the 
values underlying U.S. Supreme Court cases decided during the 
Lochner era. Named for the 1905 Supreme Court case, Lochner v. 
                                                                                                             
there are no alternative means of communication); N.L.R.B. v. Babcock & Wilcox 
Co., 351 U.S. 105, 112 (1956) (holding that employer’s property rights may also 
yield in cases where the employer is discriminating against the union). 
 19 See generally G. William Domhoff, The Rise and Fall of Labor Unions In 
The U.S. (Feb. 2013), http://www2.ucsc.edu/whorulesamerica/power/history_of_
labor_unions.html. 
 20 See generally UNITED NATIONS HUMAN RIGHTS: OFFICE OF THE HIGH 
COMM’R, ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL RIGHTS: HANDBOOK FOR 
NATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS INSTITUTIONS 28 (2005), http://www.ohchr.org/Doc-
uments/Publications/training12en.pdf. 
 21 See infra Part II. 
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New York,22 the Lochner era describes a series of cases decided be-
tween 1897 and 1937 in which the Supreme Court struck down state 
legislation regulating business on grounds that such legislation un-
constitutionally interfered with the business’s liberty interests.23 The 
New Deal partially disrupts this paradigm, insofar as the Supreme 
Court began to find constitutionally permissible statutes regulating 
businesses, such as the National Labor Relations Act24 and the Fair 
Labor Standards Act.25 But almost from the very start, the Court, 
Congress, and even executive agencies created to enforce these acts 
began to chip away at their efficacy in favor of business interests.26 
Lochner’s resurrection in the late twentieth and early twenty-first 
centuries makes a human rights account of workers’ rights important 
in counteracting the dehumanization of workers as factors of pro-
duction and whose value to society is measured instrumentally. Pol-
icy-makers need to draw upon alternative models of thinking in 
making rules that better society. 
E. The Human Rights Model Refocuses Our Thinking about 
Workers as Citizens Who Possess Natural Human Rights Rather 
Than as Factors of Production 
In Part III, I introduce the thinking of British sociologist, 
Thomas Humphrey Marshall, who endorsed the idea of full citizen-
ship.27 Full citizenship, as adapted here, is an account of labor law 
where the worker is entitled to the full gamut of rights regardless of 
his or her legal status (e.g., statutory employee, independent con-
tractor, migrant worker, undocumented worker) and thus helps com-
bat the no-duty-holder problem.28 Using Marshall’s framework to 
explain that full citizens possess political, civil, and social rights, I 
explain that workers’ rights29 do not fit neatly into Marshall’s rubric 
                                                                                                             
 22 Lochner v. N.Y., 198 U.S. 45 (1905). 
 23 See, e.g., id. at 64. 
 24 29 U.S.C. §§ 151–57 (2012). 
 25 Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201–19 (2012). 
 26 See Anne Marie Lofaso, The Persistence of Union Repression in an Era of 
Recognition, 62 ME. L. REV. 199, 201–02 (2010) [hereinafter The Persistence of 
Union]. 
 27 See infra Part III.A. 
 28 Id. 
 29 For purposes of this paper, I refer to collective bargaining and the proce-
dural rights typically found in the National Labor Relations Act and other labor 
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not only because they are socio-economic rights (which Marshall 
had not contemplated) but also because they cut across these and 
other categories. 
Building on Marshall’s citizenship model, Part IV presents a 
framework for evaluating workplace laws based on the worker as a 
citizen of the labor force who has human rights. This framework 
starts by deconstructing the terms “human” and “rights.” Drawing 
primarily on the theories of Immanual Kant, Joseph Raz, and others, 
I conclude that workers’ rights must be grounded in at least two val-
ues—autonomy and dignity—and that such rights must be as auton-
omous as possible from employer coercion. 
Part V introduces the work of John Rawls’s Theory of Justice.30 
I show that Rawls’ original position, applied to the workplace, 
brings us close to generating a set of natural rights grounded in 
moral values. I argue that we can get even closer by tweaking Rawls 
so that the original position is filled with individuals who are not 
only behind a veil of ignorance—insofar as they don’t know their 
particular circumstances—but also have the capacity to feel what 
every member of society feels given any policy decision. In this po-
sition, individuals would agree on two values to ground workplace 
rules—autonomy and dignity—and would take steps to minimize 
workplace coercion. 
F. Refocusing Our Attention on Workers as People Clarifies the 
Conflict Between Employers’ and Workers’ Interests Over How the 
Wealth They Create Should Be Distributed 
In Part VI, I apply the thinking used in Parts IV and V to the 
workplace to show that employers’ and employees’ interests conflict 
at the foundational level. This conflict results in gridlock between 
those who believe that promoting employers’ interests will result in 
a more liberated, and therefore better, society and those who believe 
that promoting workers’ interests will create a more just, and there-
fore better, society. I show that the point of greatest conflict is not 
on the financial well-being of the firm (in which both labor and man-
agement/owners have an interest) but on how the wealth created by 
                                                                                                             
statutes as labor rights; substantive rights for workers as the floor of rights; I re-
serve the general term workers’ rights to include all rights that workers might 
enjoy including the basic labor and substantive work rights. 
 30 JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1999). 
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labor and capital working together should be distributed. In Part VII, 
I share some concluding thoughts. 
II. THE U.S. LAW AND ECONOMICS MODEL: A HISTORICAL 
PERSPECTIVE 
A. During the Lochner Era, the Court Grants Constitutional 
Protection to a Business Entity’s Right To Discharge its Workers 
In the nineteenth century, U.S. workers fought for labor rights 
by engaging in economic pressure, where laborers banded together 
for mutual aid or protection.31 These workers—whether formally or 
informally organized into unions—bargained collectively for better 
wages and working conditions or conducted strikes, under the sup-
position that there was strength in numbers.32 Where the federal or 
state government did act to grant workers’ rights, businesses reacted 
quickly, moving courts to strike down such laws and regulations as 
unlawful interference with their rights to contract freely with work-
ers.33 Labor law thinkers have also long noticed the tension between 
the values underlying a free market economy, which in particular 
has valued the property rights of those individuals who own capital, 
and those values underlying workers’ rights, whether collective or 
individual in nature.34 These arguments and judicial decisions were 
based on emerging economic theories underlying laissez-faire capi-
talism. These theories soon established the dominant legal paradigm 
in early twentieth-century jurisprudence during what is now called 
the Lochner era.35 
Nowhere is this free market legal paradigm better illustrated in 
the labor context than in Coppage v. Kansas,36 where, in the context 
                                                                                                             
 31 See Domhoff, supra note 19. 
 32 The history of judicial repression of early unions is beyond the scope of 
this paper. For more information, see The Persistence of Union, supra note 26, at 
200, 206. 
 33 See, e.g., Lochner v. N.Y., 198 U.S. 45, 57–58 (1905). 
 34 See infra Part II.B. 
 35 See Lochner, 198 U.S. at 57–58 (striking down as unconstitutional New 
York state law prohibiting bakers’ from working more than 60 hours per week on 
the rationale that the state statute unlawfully interfered with the bakers’ freedom 
to contract to work more hours). 
 36 Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1, 19 (1915). 
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of reaffirming an employer’s right to terminate the employment re-
lationship because of an employee’s union membership, the Court 
wrote: 
[W]herever the right of private property exists, there 
must and will be inequalities of fortune; and thus it 
naturally happens that parties negotiating about a 
contract are not equally unhampered by circum-
stances. This applies to all contracts, and not merely 
to that between employer and employ[ee]. Indeed a 
little reflection will show that wherever the right of 
private property and the right of free contract co-ex-
ist, each party when contracting is inevitably more or 
less influenced by the question whether he has much 
property, or little, or none; for the contract is made to 
the very end that each may gain something that he 
needs or desires more urgently than that which he 
proposes to give in exchange. And, since it is self-
evident that, unless all things are held in common, 
some persons must have more property than others, 
it is from the nature of things impossible to uphold 
freedom of contract and the right of private property 
without at the same time recognizing as legitimate 
those inequalities of fortune that are the necessary re-
sult of the exercise of those rights. But the Fourteenth 
Amendment, in declaring that a State shall not ‘de-
prive any person of . . . liberty, or property without 
due process of law,’ gives to each of these an equal 
sanction; it recognizes ‘liberty’ and ‘property’ as co-
existent human rights, and debars the States from any 
unwarranted interference with either. 
And since a State may not strike them down directly, 
it is clear that it may not do so indirectly, as by de-
claring in effect that the public good requires the re-
moval of those inequalities that are but the normal 
and inevitable result of their exercise, and then in-
voking the police power in order to remove the ine-
qualities, without other object in view. The police 
power is broad, and not easily defined, but it cannot 
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be given the wide scope that is here asserted for it, 
without in effect nullifying the constitutional guar-
anty.37 
Here, the Court acknowledges the inequities inevitable in a free 
market system grounded in property and contract rights.38 On 
grounds that the Fourteenth Amendment grants cognizable property 
and liberty rights, with which the state may not interfere even in the 
name of removing these unfortunate inequities, the Court upholds 
the employer’s right to force employees to sign a yellow-dog con-
tract (agreement to renounce union membership as a condition of 
employment) on threat of termination.39 Accordingly, in Coppage v. 
Kansas, the Court resolved in the employer’s favor the tension be-
tween the worker’s interest in banding together for mutual aid or 
protection in the form of union membership and the employer’s in-
terest in running its business free from union interference, that is, 
the interference of workers’ collective voice.40 
Notice the following three facets of the Court’s resolution of the 
tension inherent in the employee-employer relationship. First, the 
Court reifies the business entity into a person.41 The facts of Cop-
page—in which the state convicted supervisor Coppage for dis-
charging employee Hedges when Hedges refused to sign a yellow-
dog contract with employer St. Louis & San Francisco Railway 
Company disavowing his union membership—allowed the Court to 
personify the business entity.42 The rationale for reversing Cop-
page’s conviction had nothing to do with his conviction being unjust 
(i.e., he didn’t do it) or procedurally flawed. Instead the Court found 
the criminal law itself unconstitutional based on the following argu-
ment typical of the Lochner era:43 (1) business entities and their em-
ployees have a cognizable liberty interest to freely contract with one 
                                                                                                             
 37 Id. at 17–18. 
 38 See id. 
 39 See id. at 25–26. 
 40 Id. at 26. See, e.g., Alan Bogg & Tonia Novitz, The Purposes and Tech-
niques of Voice: Prospects for Continuity and Change, in VOICES AT WORK: 
CONTINUITY AND CHANGE IN THE COMMON LAW WORLD 4, 13–14, 16 (Alan Bogg 
& Tonia Novitz eds. 2014). 
 41 See Coppage, 236 U.S. at 8–13. 
 42 See id. at 7. 
 43 See id. at 25–26; see also Lochner v. N.Y., 198 U.S. 45, 57–58 (1905). 
580 UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 71:565 
 
another; (2) inequality between or among parties is natural and 
based on property rights; (3) liberty and property rights are consti-
tutional equals and, therefore, the law cannot favor one over the 
other; and (4) at-will employment actualizes this mutual liberty be-
tween the parties without interfering with the parties’ property 
rights.44 
Second, personifying the business entity permits the Court to 
treat the business or employer as an individual who possesses liberty 
and property rights. Although the Court also views workers as indi-
viduals who possess these rights, it misses the point that these work-
ers have no property (outside their own labor power) and therefore 
no property rights. For that reason, they cannot use their liberty to 
contract in any meaningful way without strengthening their bargain-
ing position in some other manner. For nearly 200 years, workers 
have strengthened their bargaining position by banding together to 
aggregate their one possession—their labor power.45 The collective 
thereby enhances individual power in much the same way that prop-
erty enhances the employer’s power. In stark contrast to the way 
businesses are personified, the Court treats the workers’ interest in 
concerted activity as a non-personal, collective interest in union 
membership.46 The business is a person who has the capacity to hold 
rights; the union remains an entity devoid of capacity—one which 
cannot hold rights.47 The Court’s analysis ironically grants human 
rights to a state-created entity and removes the basic human right—
the right to associate—from live humans. In effect, the Court de-
personifies the individual. Moreover, by arrogating the employer’s 
interest in discharging an employee to the level of a cognizable lib-
erty and property right—indeed, a human right, the Court constitu-
tionally protects, that is, forbids states from interfering with that 
right, absent a compelling justification.48 The Court did not need to 
worry about the effect such protection might have had on the union 
because, at least in the view of some, a union was considered a cor-
rupt institution, in the way we might today think of organized crime 
or monopolistic businesses. 
                                                                                                             
 44 See Coppage, 236 U.S. at 12–13, 17–18, 23–26. 
 45 See Domhoff, supra note 19. 
 46 See Coppage, 236 U.S. at 19–20. 
 47 Id. 
 48 Id. at 16, 25–26. 
2017] WORKERS' RIGHTS AS NATURAL HUMAN RIGHTS 581 
 
Relatedly, the Court gave no thought to the fact that a union is 
actually a collection of human beings who gather together for the 
legitimate purpose of augmenting their own individual interests in 
survival, autonomy, dignity, and personal actualization. Accord-
ingly, no thought was given to the collective interest of workers’ in 
augmenting their own liberty to participate in workplace decisions 
that affect their well-being or even to the idea that the employer’s 
actions themselves might be interfering with the employee’s free-
dom to associate with other members of the working class. In effect, 
the Court chose (probably subconsciously) the employer’s auton-
omy interest to engage in unilateral decision-making in the work-
place over the employee’s autonomy interest to engage in decisions 
affecting his or her work life.49 Whether consciously or subcon-
sciously, the effect was the same—collectivized capital (a state fab-
rication) was branded as natural, while collectivized labor (an or-
ganic collection of real people) was not. 
Third, the Court’s disregard for worker Hedges’ interest in aug-
menting his own liberty to join a union as well the liberty-augmen-
tation resulting from union membership (which would have allowed 
him to participate in workplace decisions that affected his own well-
being) was achieved primarily in two ways: (1) by focusing on prop-
erty rights—the employer has them, the employee does not—and (2) 
by defining liberty as the freedom from government coercion (neg-
ative right) as opposed to the right of US citizens to expect the gov-
ernment to help provide the resources workers need to fulfill their 
own destinies (positive right).50 The Court’s formalistic reading of 
the Constitution when it notes quite correctly that the Constitution 
does not favor liberty (defined as the negative right, freedom from) 
over property rights (defined by those who have them) seals the 
deal.51 
Combining these ideas, the Court creates the illusion of a tautol-
ogy. If the government’s constitutional duty is to refrain from inter-
fering with person O’s liberty to do what O wants to do with O’s 
property, then the government cannot interfere with that right even 
                                                                                                             
 49 See Anne Marie Lofaso, Toward a Foundational Theory of Workers’ 
Rights: The Autonomous Dignified Worker, 76 UMKC L. REV. 1, 29, 47–48 
(2007) [hereinafter Toward a Foundational Theory]. 
 50 See Coppage, 236 U.S. at 12–18. 
 51 See id.  
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when what O wants to do is to interfere with another person’s (E’s) 
liberty. The argument appears tautological because the “even when” 
clause is never acknowledged; it is simply invisible. The govern-
ment owes O a duty not to interfere with his property rights because 
O has property rights. Full stop. There is no consideration of the so-
called equal liberty interests of E. As a result, the Court never has to 
explain why it is permissible to interfere with the employees’ 
equally valid liberty interests and free associational rights. As prom-
inent constitutional law theorist Professor C. Edwin Baker (1947–
2009) observed, “This stipulation, often an intellectually lazy way 
to avoid thinking through the legal implications of a state commit-
ment to respect autonomy, makes the term [liberty] virtually mean-
ingless for purposes of constructive legal theory or political the-
ory . . . .”52 
In sum, the Lochnerian free market paradigm features several 
characteristics. Business entities are persons with individual rights, 
including constitutional rights; freedom of contract encompasses a 
business entity’s cognizable liberty interest to enter into a contract 
to buy the labor of individual workers; workers also possess cog-
nizable liberty interests, including the freedom to enter a contract 
with business entities to sell their labor, which interests are protected 
by Lochner.53 The freedom to associate with other workers or to 
band together with other workers for the purposes of augmenting 
bargaining leverage is invisible and, therefore, weightless. 
B. The New Deal Partially Disrupts the Free Market Paradigm 
The Lochnerian paradigm perished as a matter of U.S. constitu-
tional jurisprudence. In a series of cases challenging the Roosevelt 
administration’s New Deal legislation, which expanded the power 
                                                                                                             
 52 C. Edwin Baker, Autonomy and Free Speech, 27 CONST. COMMENT. 251, 
252 (2011). 
 53 See Coppage, 236 U.S. at 12–26; Lochner v. N.Y., 198 U.S. 45, 63 (1905). 
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of the federal government to regulate business, the Court held con-
stitutional federal statutes regulating labor relations54 and social se-
curity,55 as well as public utilities56 and other industries.57 It also 
                                                                                                             
 54 See Virginian Ry. Co. v. Sys. Fed’n No. 40, 300 U.S. 515, 528, 553–54 
(1937) (upholding amendment to the Railway Labor Act under interstate com-
merce clause); N.L.R.B. v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 12, 30 
(1937) (upholding the National Labor Relations Act under the Commerce Clause 
as applied to large steel manufacturer); N.L.R.B. v. Fruehauf Trailer Co., 301 U.S. 
49, 53, 57 (1937) (same; as applied to manufacturer of commercial trailers); 
N.L.R.B. v. Friedman-Harry Marks Clothing Co., 301 U.S. 58, 72, 75 (1937) 
(same; as applied to manufacturer of men’s clothing); Associated Press v. 
N.L.R.B., 301 U.S. 103, 128–29 (1937) (same; as applied to a not-for-profit news 
association); Wash. Va. & Md. Coach Co. v. N.L.R.B., 301 U.S. 142, 144, 146–
47 (1937) (same; as applied to interstate bus company). 
 55 See Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619, 634, 645 (1937) (upholding Social 
Security Act); Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 584 (1937) (upholding 
provisions of the Social Security Act relating to taxes on employers and credits 
toward those taxes for payments made to state unemployment insurance funds). 
 56 See Am. Power & Light Co. v. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, 329 U.S. 90, 99–
100 (1946) (enforcing the Public Utility Holding Company Act); Am. Tel. & Tel. 
Co. v. U.S., 299 U.S. 232, 235, 247 (1936) (upholding FCC provisions regulating 
telephone companies). 
 57 See, e.g., Anniston Mfg. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 337, 340, 351–52 (1937) 
(upholding Agricultural Adjustment Act); Holyoke Water Power Co. v. American 
Writing Paper Co., 300 U.S. 324, 340–41 (1937) (upholding federal monetary 
policy embodied in the Gold Reserve Act of 1934); Cincinnati Soap Co. v. U.S., 
301 U.S. 308, 311 312 (1937) (upholding tax imposed on first domestic processor 
of coconut oil); Sonzinsky v. U.S., 300 U.S. 506, 512–13 (1937) (upholding under 
Congress’s taxing powers the National Firearms Act, which provides for an an-
nual federal license tax on firearms dealers, as an aid to collecting tax revenue); 
Wright v. Vinton Branch of the Mountain Tr. Bank, 300 U.S. 440, 460–61 (1937) 
(upholding Bankruptcy Act’s regulatory effect on banking industry); U.S. v. Hud-
son, 299 U.S. 498, 500–01 (1937) (upholding 35-day retroactive period on federal 
tax on profits accruing from sale of interests in silver bullion); Ky. Whip & Collar 
Co. v. Ill. Cent. R.R. Co., 299 U.S. 334, 348, 352–53 (1937) (upholding re-
strictions on the importation of goods made by prisoner labor into states prohibit-
ing their sale); U.S. v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 325–28 (1936) 
(upholding President’s authority to declare embargo on the sale of arms to pro-
mote peace). 
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upheld state statutes implementing the New Deal or regulating in-
dustry under the states’ police powers,58 thereby officially ending 
the Lochner era.59 
The idea that the federal government is authorized to regulate 
business entities disrupts the Lochnerian world view. The National 
Labor Relations Act (NLRA) illustrates this disruption and how, in 
particular, Congress’s findings are in stark opposition to those pos-
ited by the Supreme Court in Coppage. NLRA Section 1 recognizes 
that “employers who are organized in the corporate or other forms 
of ownership association” are collective entities, as opposed to indi-
vidual persons.60 Section 1 recognizes that there is an “inequality of 
bargaining power” between these collective business entities and 
“employees who do not possess full freedom of association or actual 
liberty of contract[.]”61 Based on these congressional findings, 
NLRA Section 7 grants employees “the right to self-organization, to 
form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively 
through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in 
other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or 
other mutual aid or protection . . . .”62 
Enactment of the NLRA and its subsequent enforcement by the 
U.S. Supreme Court in NLRB v. Jones and Laughlin Steel Corpora-
tion,63 shattered the legal illusion of freedom of contract. But these 
                                                                                                             
 58 See Carmichael v. S. Coal & Coke Co., 301 U.S. 495, 525–26 (1937) (up-
holding Alabama’s implementation of the Social Security Act); W. Coast Hotel 
Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 398–99 (1937) (upholding state minimum wage law 
for women). 
 59 See Lochner v. N.Y., 198 U.S. 45, 57–58 (1905) (striking down as uncon-
stitutional New York state law prohibiting bakers’ from working more than 60 
hours per week on the rationale that the state statute unlawfully interfered with 
the bakers’ freedom to contract to work more hours). 
 60 29 U.S.C. § 151 (2012). 
 61 Id. 
 62 29 U.S.C. § 157 (2012). 
 63 N.L.R.B. v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 12, 30 (1937) (up-
holding the National Labor Relations Act under the Commerce Clause as applied 
to large steel manufacturer); see also N.L.R.B. v. Fruehauf Trailer Co., 301 U.S. 
49, 53 (1937) (same, “manufacture, assembly, sale, and distribution of commer-
cial trailers and of trailer parts and accessories” industry); N.L.R.B. v. Friedman-
Harry Marks Clothing Co., 301 U.S. 58, 72, 75 (1937) (same, purchase of raw 
materials and the sale and distribution of men’s clothing industry); Associated 
Press v. N.L.R.B., 301 U.S. 103, 128–29 (1937) (same, news gathering and dis-
tributing and interstate communication industries); Washington, Va. & Md. 
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governmental acts did nothing to disrupt the economic paradigm 
upon which the Lochner era was built. Just as progressives took ac-
tion to chip away at and ultimately disrupt the Lochner judicial view, 
free market conservatives took action almost immediately to whittle 
away at the regulatory system. Perhaps tensions would have inten-
sified even more rapidly had World War II not erupted and had or-
ganized labor not be so useful in the war effort. 
C. Lochner’s Resurrection 
During the post-war era, Congress, U.S. courts, and even the 
NLRB itself have resurrected a Lochnerian paradigm by using free 
market values to chip away at New Deal values and reinstate a view 
of workers as mere factors of production rather than as individuals 
who hold human rights. Sundry legislative acts, cases, and adminis-
trative orders illustrate this phenomenon.64 The 1947 Taft-Hartley 
amendments, as interpreted, present the earliest and the most infa-
mous illustration of resurrection by Congress. For example, 
amended Section 2(3) writes “supervisors” and “independent con-
tractors” out of the NLRA’s protection,65 thereby returning those 
workers to a pre-New Deal legal state, factors of production who do 
not possess the right to freely associate.66 Indeed, Congress defined 
“supervisor” broadly, so that any worker who, using “independent 
judgment,” exercises even one of twelve enumerated powers “in the 
interest of the employer” is a statutory supervisor and is not pro-
tected.67  
                                                                                                             
Coach Co. v. N.L.R.B., 301 U.S. 142, 144, 146–47 (1937) (same, transportation 
industry). 
 64 See infra notes 65–71 and accompanying text. 
 65 NLRA Section 2(3) broadly defines the term “employee” to include “any 
employee” unless expressly excluded. 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (2012). In 1947, Con-
gress amended Section 2(3) to exclude supervisors and independent contractors. 
See 29 U.S.C. §§ 141–97 (2012), legislatively overruling Packard Motor Car Co. 
v. N.L.R.B., 330 U.S. 485, 491–92 (1947) (holding that low-level foremen are 
statutory employees) and N.L.R.B. v. Hearst Publ’ns, Inc., 322 U.S. 111, 131–32 
(1944) (holding that newspapers boys are statutory employees). See also 29 
U.S.C. § 152(11) (2006). See generally Anne Marie Lofaso, The Vanishing Em-
ployee, 5 F.I.U. L. REV. 495, 520–21 (2010) [hereinafter Vanishing Employee]. 
 66 The Persistence of Union, supra note 26, at 201. 
 67 Section 2(11) provides: 
The term “supervisor” means any individual having authority, in the interest of 
the employer, to hire, transfer, suspend, lay off, recall, promote, discharge, assign, 
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The Court continued this trend most recently in a series of pro-
fessional-supervisor cases, in which the Court twice rejected the 
Board’s construction of the statutory exemption for supervisors to 
exclude professionals who may direct other employees but should 
not be considered statutory supervisors because in exercising such 
direction those professional employees are using professional rather 
than supervisory judgment.68 And most disappointingly, the NLRB, 
the agency charged by Congress with fulfilling the purposes of the 
NLRA, brought this trend to a new low by reading out of the 
NLRA’s protection several subclasses of employees, including 
graduate assistants69 and mentally disabled workers,70 neither of 
whom are statutorily exempted.71 
In late August 2016, the Obama Board tried to reverse this trend 
by issuing Columbia University, which held that graduate teaching 
assistants are employees, expressly overruling prior precedent.72 
There, the Board acknowledged that answers to the question about 
                                                                                                             
reward, or discipline other employees, or responsibly to direct them, or to adjust 
their grievances, or effectively to recommend such action, if in connection with 
the foregoing the exercise of such authority is not of a merely routine or clerical 
nature, but requires the use of independent judgment. 
29 U.S.C. § 152(11); see The Persistence of Union, supra note 26, at 210. 
 68 See N.L.R.B. v. Ky. River Cmty. Care, Inc., 532 U.S. 706, 715–717 (2001) 
(rejecting N.L.R.B.’s definition of “independent judgment”); N.L.R.B. v. Health 
Care & Retirement Corp., 511 U.S. 571, 578–579 (1994) (rejecting the Board’s 
construction of the statutory phrase “in the interest of the employer”); see also 
The Persistence of Union, supra note 26, at 211. 
 69 See Brown Univ., 342 N.L.R.B. 483, 483 (2004) (holding that graduate 
student assistants are not statutory employees because they “have a predominately 
academic, rather than economic, relationship with their school.”) overruled by 
Columbia Univ., 364 N.L.R.B. 1, 1 (2016). See also Leyland Stanford Junior 
Univ., 214 N.L.R.B. 621, 623 (1974) (holding that research assistants were not 
employees because they were “primarily students”). 
 70 See Brevard Achievement Ctr., Inc., 342 N.L.R.B. 982, 982–83 (2004) 
(holding that mentally disabled workers are not statutory employees because their 
relationship with their employer is “primarily rehabilitative”). 
 71 There are only seven statutory exemptions: agricultural workers, domestic 
servants, children/spouses, independent contractors, supervisors, employees cov-
ered by the Railway Labor Act, and public employees. 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (2012). 
The Act expressly covers all other workers. See The Persistence of Union, supra 
note 26, at 212. 
 72 Columbia Univ., 364 N.L.R.B. 1, 1 (2016). 
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whether graduate teaching assistants were employees or not had os-
cillated several times in the past half century.73  Protections for these 
workers is likely short-lived under an NLRB whose members will 
be appointed by President Donald Trump and a Republican-domi-
nated Senate. 
What, if anything, does the NLRA’s definition of “employee” 
say about Lochner, its counter-world view embodied in the New 
Deal, and Lochner’s resurrection? The history of the congressional 
amendment to that term, coupled with the judicial and administra-
tive constructions of it, relays the philosophical conflict that is cur-
rently directing U.S. political theatre. As President Bill Clinton 
stated at the 2012 Democratic Convention, “[w]e think ‘we’re all in 
this together’ is a better philosophy than ‘you’re on your own[,]’” 
referring to the conflicting world views of the Democratic and Re-
publican Party platforms.74  President (then-candidate) Trump put 
his unique spin on that philosophy when he now-infamously told 
                                                                                                             
 73 Id. (overruling Brown Univ., 342 N.L.R.B. 483 (2004), which itself had 
overruled New York Univ., 332 N.L.R.B. 1205, 1205 (2000) (holding that NYU 
graduate assistants are employees)). 
 74 President Bill Clinton, Address to the Democratic Nat’l Convention (Sep. 
5, 2012), http://articles.marketwatch.com/2012-09-05/economy/33617274_1_
jobs-equal-opportunity-democrats [hereinafter Clinton Address]. He ended the 
speech with a similar comparison: 
My fellow Americans, you have to decide what kind of country 
you want to live in. If you want a you’re on your own, winner 
take all society you should support the Republican ticket. If you 
want a country of shared opportunities and shared responsibili-
ties - a “we’re all in it together” society, you should vote for 
Barack Obama and Joe Biden. If you want every American to 
vote and you think it’s wrong to change voting procedures just 
to reduce the turnout of younger, poorer, minority and disabled 
voters, you should support Barack Obama. If you think the 
President was right to open the doors of American opportunity 
to young immigrants brought here as children who want to go 
to college or serve in the military, you should vote for Barack 
Obama. If you want a future of shared prosperity, where the 
middle class is growing and poverty is declining, where the 
American Dream is alive and well, and where the United States 
remains the leading force for peace and prosperity in a highly 
competitive world, you should vote for Barack Obama. Id. 
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audience members at the 2016 Republic National Convention that 
“I alone can fix it.”75 
A similar observation—that a society with unions and a world 
without unions reflects differing world views—has been repeated by 
one of U.S. Labor’s academic gurus, Professor James A. Gross, who 
wrote: 
[T]hough some see workers’ human rights as threats 
to the free enterprise system, others see the same 
rights as concealing a selfish egoism no different 
than the libertarian individualism central to the un-
regulated market philosophy. The language of indi-
vidual rights does encourage people to consider only 
“my rights,” “my house,” “my money,” “my prop-
erty,” and “my family” . . . .No doubt, as Louis Blanc 
wrote in 1847, claims of rights can and have been 
used “to mask the injustice of a regime of individu-
alism and the barbarism of the abandonment of the 
poor” . . . .This ego-centric focus of human rights, 
some have argued, operates to the detriment of 
worker solidarity and collective action.76 
What we see here, then, is an attempt by those who wish to aug-
ment the power of the powerful by critically characterizing policies 
designed to empower working people as interfering with the prop-
erty and liberty rights of those who already dominate society. 
III. DEVELOPING A HUMAN RIGHTS RUBRIC FOR WORKERS’ RIGHTS 
A. Interdependence: T.H. Marshall’s Political, Civil, and Social 
Rights Rubric 
British sociologist Thomas Humphrey Marshall (1893–1981) 
focused on the idea of rights through citizenship. Writing in the mid-
                                                                                                             
 75 Yoni Appelbaum, ‘I Alone Can Fix It’, THE ATLANTIC (July 21, 2016), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/07/trump-rnc-speech-alone-
fix-it/492557/. 
 76 James A. Gross, The Human Rights Movement at U.S. Workplaces: Chal-
lenges and Changes, 65 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 3, 4 (2012) (citing LOUIS 
HENKIN ET AL., HUMAN RIGHTS 59 n.1 (Found. Press 1999) (emphasis added)). 
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twentieth century in post-war Europe, T. H. Marshall presented a 
historical account of the development of citizenship rights.77 These 
rights, according to Marshall, can be divided into three types: polit-
ical rights, civil rights, and social rights: 
I propose to divide citizenship into three 
parts . . . .civil, political, and social. The civil element 
is composed of the rights necessary for individual 
freedom—liberty of the person, freedom of speech, 
thought and faith, the right to own property and to 
conclude valid contracts, and the right to justice. The 
last is of a different order from the others, because it 
is the right to defend and assert all one’s rights on 
terms of equality with others and by due process of 
law. This shows us that the institutions most directly 
associated with civil rights are the courts of justice. 
By the political element I mean the right to partici-
pate in the exercise of political power, as a member 
of a body invested with political authority or as an 
elector of the members of such a body. The corre-
sponding institutions are parliament and councils of 
local government. By the social element I mean the 
whole range from the right to a modicum of eco-
nomic welfare and security to the right to share to the 
full in the social heritage and to live the life of a civ-
ilized being according to the standards prevailing in 
the society. The institutions most closely connected 
with it are the education system and the social ser-
vices.78 
Using Marshall’s rubric, political rights79 might be thought of as 
the basic rights needed to participate in self-governance such as the 
right to vote or to serve in political office; civil rights80 as the basic 
freedoms enjoyed in the U.S., Canada, and other democracies such 
                                                                                                             
 77 T.H. MARSHALL, CITIZENSHIP AND SOCIAL CLASS (Doubleday & Co., Inc., 
1964), reprinted in CLASS, CITIZENSHIP & SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT 71–95 (Green-
wood Press, 1973). 
 78 Id. at 71–72 (emphasis added). 
 79 See id. at 71–72. 
 80 See id. at 71. 
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as freedom of expression and religion; and social rights81 as the ba-
sics for survival in an advanced capitalist society, such as the right 
to food, clothing, shelter, education, and health care. We can expand 
this rubric to include two other types of rights: cultural rights82—
such as the right to speak one’s native language and the right to par-
ticipate in one’s own cultural life—and economic rights83—such as 
the right to a living wage and safe working conditions. 
These ideas—to be a full member of society a person must have 
certain basic civil, political, and social (including economic and cul-
tural) rights—were highly influential in the establishment of the Eu-
ropean Economic Community in 195784 and its development into 
the European Union. But even in Europe and internationally, these 
rights were weighted differently. As Canadian Professor Judy Fudge 
has noted: 
[D]uring the post-war period human rights were gen-
erally divided into different types with different legal 
statuses . . . .The distinction between civil and polit-
ical rights, on the one hand, and social and economic 
rights, on the other, deepened with the Cold War, and 
in 1952 the United Nation’s General Assembly 
passed a resolution to divide the rights proclaimed in 
the UDHR [Universal Declaration of Human Rights] 
into two separate covenants. The International Cov-
enant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social, and 
                                                                                                             
 81 See id. at 72. 
 82 See BEN SAUL ET AL., THE INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON ECONOMIC, 
SOCIAL AND CULTURAL RIGHTS: COMMENTARY, CASES, AND MATERIALS 1191 
(Oxford Univ. Press, 2014). 
 83 See UNITED NATIONS HUMAN RIGHTS: OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMM’R,, 
FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS ON ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL RIGHTS 
1–3 (2008), http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/ESCR/FAQ%20on%20ES
CR-en.pdf. 
 84 Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community art. 3, Mar. 25, 
1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 11. 
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Cultural Rights (ICESCR) were adopted in 1966, 
and came into force in 1976.85 
By contrast, the idea that citizens are entitled to the full gamut 
of political, civil, and social rights has not been as influential in the 
U.S., which has focused on civil and political rights often at the ex-
pense of social rights.86 Indeed, while the U.S. has ratified the 
ICCPR, it has not ratified the ICESCR.87 
B. The Rights of Workers at the Workplace Are Often Difficult to 
Classify Using T.H. Marshall’s Rubric 
This returns us to Marshall’s rubric. My concern is not so much 
in classifying rights, which can be used to misdirect the debate, as 
President Clinton88 and Professor Gross89 point out, and as an anal-
ysis of the Lochner cases demonstrates, but in using rights-based 
classifications to better understand the nature of workers’ rights. 
Given this jurisprudential goal, the following observation about 
Marshall’s rubric is illuminating. There appear to be easy cases and 
hard cases in determining what types of rights fit into each category. 
For example, free speech fits nicely into civil rights and the right to 
vote fits squarely into the category of political rights. But where 
does the right to bargain collectively fit? To the extent that collective 
bargaining can be categorized as an exercise of a worker’s freedom 
                                                                                                             
 85 Judy Fudge, The New Discourse of Labor Rights: From Social to Funda-
mental Rights?, 29 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 29, 35–36 (2007) (emphasis in orig-
inal); see also David Landau, The Reality of Social Rights Enforcement, 53 HARV. 
INT’L L. J. 189, 193 (2012) (explaining that “[t]he ideological importance of [so-
cial] rights gained force in the post-World-War II period, with a parade of post-
colonial constitutions in the developing world.”). 
 86 See Landau, supra note 85, at 193–202 (characterizing the U.S. as “excep-
tional” in its rejection of incorporating social rights at the constitutional level, but 
hypothesizing (and testing the hypothesis) that even countries, which have con-
sciously attempted to incorporate social rights into their jurisprudence, tend to 
favor middle and upper-class citizens rather than poor and other marginalized cit-
izens). 
 87 See UNITED NATIONS TREATY COLLECTION, Status of Treaties: Interna-
tional Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, https://treaties.un.org/
Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=IND&mtdsg_no=IV-3&chapter=4&clang=_en 
(last visited Mar. 10, 2017). 
 88 Clinton Address, supra note 74. 
 89 Gross, supra note 76, at 4. 
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of association, it appears to be a civil right. To the extent that it can 
be categorized as participating in work-life decision-making, 
thereby helping workers become more active members of their po-
litical communities, it may be a political right. Even more on point, 
to the extent that the worker is a public-sector employee, then the 
connection between collective bargaining and political rights is even 
more robust.90 To the extent that the right to bargain collectively can 
be viewed as the process by which workers secure a living wage, 
then perhaps that right is an economic right.91 To summarize, the 
composition of these rights is fuzzy at the boundaries and sometimes 
overlapping even if we can imagine examples of these rights that 
fall squarely into each category. 
Whether workers’ rights or labor rights are civil rights, political 
rights, social rights, some combination of these rights, or some other 
unique right, such as economic or socio-economic rights, is not an-
swered by Marshall’s rubric.92 Marshall indirectly concedes this 
point when, just a few paragraphs after introducing his rubric, he 
notes: 
In the economic field the basic civil right is the right 
to work, that is to say the right to follow the occupa-
tion of one’s choice in the place of one’s choice, sub-
ject only to legitimate demands for preliminary tech-
nical training . . . . By the beginning of the nineteenth 
century this principle of individual economic free-
dom was accepted as axiomatic.93 
Marshall then notes: 
The original source of social rights was membership 
of local communities and functional associations. 
This source was supplemented and progressively re-
                                                                                                             
 90 See, e.g., Anne Marie Lofaso, In Defense of Public Sector Unions, 28 
HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L. J. 301, 316–17, 321 (2011) [hereinafter Public Sector 
Unions]. 
 91 See generally MARSHALL, supra note 77, at 75. 
 92 For purposes of this paper, it doesn’t matter to me how we classify labor 
rights. Instead, I am applying the insights of previous human rights thinkers to 
better understand how we should think of labor rights. 
 93 MARSHALL, supra note 77, at 75–76. 
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placed by a Poor Law and a system of wage regula-
tion which were nationally conceived and locally ad-
ministered . . . .As the pattern of the old order dis-
solved under the blows of a competitive econ-
omy, . . . the Poor Law was left high and dry as an 
isolated survival from which the idea of social rights 
was gradually drained away. But at the very end of 
the eighteenth century there occurred a final struggle 
between the old and the new, between the planned 
(or patterned) society and the competitive economy. 
And in this battle citizenship was divided against it-
self; social rights sided with the old and civil with the 
new.94 
What we see in just these few paragraphs is that workers’ rights 
appear to cut across categorical boundaries.95 A worker’s freedom 
to choose to work or not to work, or to select his or her profession 
and professional training, may be classified as a civil, social, or eco-
nomic right that is not enjoyed by everyone. Think of children of the 
former Soviet Union forced to leave home at a young age to become 
world-class gymnasts.96 A public school teacher’s right to strike to 
protest a local school board’s action affecting teachers’ wages might 
be classified as a political right,97 while wage and hour regulations 
might best be seen as social rights. How should we characterize, 
however, the rights of private-sector workers to distribute literature 
at the workplace protesting a Presidential veto of a federal minimum 
                                                                                                             
 94 Id. at 79. 
 95 See id. 
 96 See Toward a Foundational Theory, supra note 49, at 28. For an in-depth 
examination of this issue, see Lisa Lindhorst, Note, Behind the Mask of Glory: 
Combating Child Abuse in Olympic Boarding Schools, 47 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. 
REV. 353, 354 (2015). 
 97 See Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 574–75 (1968) (holding 
teacher’s discharge unconstitutional under First Amendment). There, a school 
board discharged a public school teacher for writing and publishing in a local 
newspaper a letter critical of a proposed tax increase based primarily on the school 
board’s allocation of money between educational and athletic programs. The 
Court held that “a teacher’s exercise of his right to speak on issues of public im-
portance may not furnish the basis for his dismissal from public employment” 
“absent proof of false statements knowingly or recklessly made by him[.]” Id. at 
574. 
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wage law or protesting a state’s attempt to constitutionalize its right-
to-work statute?98 Is this act of concerted activity best viewed as part 
of the civil right to freedom of association; the political right to pro-
test; or the social right to obtain a living wage? In this case, the clas-
sification matters, because the National Labor Relations Board gen-
erally does not extend its legislative protections to non-economic 
concerted activity and the U.S. Constitution does not protect civil or 
political protests conducted on private property. 
The sundry nature of workers’ rights explains this classification 
problem. The workplace is a microcosm of society. Just as citizens 
want to limit the government’s coercive powers, workers want to 
limit their employers’ coercive authority over them.99 Just as citi-
zens can limit the government’s authority both procedurally and 
substantively, workers can enjoy both procedural and substantive 
rights.100 
Labor rights suffer another classification infirmity. When think-
ing of workers’ rights in terms of classical labor rights, we think of 
the procedural rights afforded under Section 7 of the National Labor 
Relations Act: 
Employees shall have the right to self-organization, 
to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain 
collectively through representatives of their own 
choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities 
for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mu-
tual aid or protection, and shall also have the right to 
refrain from any or all such activities . . . .101 
Notice that not one of the rights guaranteed under Section 7 is 
an actual substantive right.102 There is no right to a particular wage, 
                                                                                                             
 98 Eastex, Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 437 U.S. 556, 558 (1978). 
 99 See generally Regina Austin, Employer Abuse, Worker Resistance, and the 
Tort of Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress, 41 STAN. L. REV. 1, 4 (1988). 
 100 See Gross, supra note 76, at 3 (noting that “[t]he purpose of human rights 
is to eliminate or minimize the vulnerability that leaves people at the mercy of 
others who have the power to hurt them.”). 
 101 29 U.S.C. § 157 (2012). 
 102 In a conversation with Hugh Collins, Vinerian Professor of English Law, 
in April 2016 at AllSouls College, Oxford, Professor Collins pointed out to me 
that the right to bargain collective and to be recognized by an employer are sub-
2017] WORKERS' RIGHTS AS NATURAL HUMAN RIGHTS 595 
 
a particular work schedule, or a particular job. There is no right to 
job security, safe working conditions, or freedom from discrimina-
tion. 
Instead, Section 7 guarantees workers the right to band together 
for two purposes. First, Section 7 guarantees workers the right to 
band together “for the purpose of collective bargaining”103 over 
“wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment[.]”104 
No particular outcome is, however, guaranteed. This interest in al-
lowing the parties to come to their own private order is so embedded 
in U.S. tradition that the NLRA forbids the government from inter-
vening to create a particular outcome that it deems socially more 
desirable.105 Second, Section 7 guarantees workers the right to band 
together for the purpose of other mutual aid or protection. As Judge 
Learned Hand so eloquently explained: 
When all the other workmen in a shop make common 
cause with a fellow workman over his separate griev-
ance, and go out on strike in his support, they engage 
in a “concerted activity” for “mutual aid or protec-
tion,” although the aggrieved workman is the only 
one of them who has any immediate stake in the out-
come. The rest know that by their action each one of 
them assures himself, in case his turn ever comes, of 
                                                                                                             
stantive rights. That is true, but not in the sense that I am contemplating. By sub-
stantive, I mean more than being able to claim an affirmative duty on the em-
ployer. I mean those goods for which unions might bargain – living wages, bene-
fits, good working conditions, among other goods. 
 103 29 U.S.C. § 157 (2012). 
 104 29 U.S.C. § 158(d). See also N.L.R.B. v. Wooster Div. of Borg-Warner 
Corp., 356 U.S. 342, 349 (1958) (limiting an employer’s duty to bargain with a 
union to mandatory subjects of bargaining; explaining that the parties may bargain 
over other “permissive” subjects; and forbidding bargaining over “illegal” sub-
jects—subjects that conflict with the obligations and rights granted under the 
NLRA). 
 105 See H.K. Porter Co., Inc., v. N.L.R.B., 397 U.S. 99, 108–09 (1970) (hold-
ing that the Board is without power to compel a company or a union to agree to 
any particular substantive contractual provisions of a collective-bargaining agree-
ment). 
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the support of the one whom they are all then help-
ing; and the solidarity so established is “mutual aid” 
in the most literal sense, as nobody doubts.106 
This clause grants workers the right, among others, to organize 
at the workplace;107 to protest low wages or poor working conditions 
by handbilling,108 by picketing,109 by striking, and even by engaging 
in a spontaneous walkout;110 to protest—even at the workplace—
low employment standards of the working class in general;111 to use 
governmental processes to force nonunion employer’s to create bet-
ter working conditions;112 to demand a witness at a disciplinary 
meeting;113 to make political pleas involving workers’ rights at the 
workplace;114 to bring a union witness to an investigatory interview 
                                                                                                             
 106 N.L.R.B. v. Peter Cailler Kohler Swiss Chocolates Co., 130 F.2d 503, 505–
06 (2d Cir. 1942). See also Hous. Insulation Contractors Ass’n v. N.L.R.B., 386 
U.S. 664, 668–69 (1967). 
 107 See, e.g., Republic Aviation Corp. v. N.L.R.B., 324 U.S. 793, 795–96, 798 
(1945) (holding that employees have the right to organize at workplace during 
nonworking time and in nonworking areas). 
 108 See, e.g., Roundy’s Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 674 F.3d 638, 655 (7th Cir. 2012) 
(holding that nonemployee union organizers have a Section 7 right to handbill 
customers of grocery store to protest store’s use of cheap labor and to inform cus-
tomers that the savings were not passed down to them). 
 109 See, e.g., N.L.R.B. v. Calkins, 187 F.3d 1080, 1089 (9th Cir. 1999) (ex-
plaining that Section 7’s mutual-aid-or-protection clause protects area standards 
picketing). 
 110 See, e.g., NL.R.B. v. Wash. Aluminum Co., 370 U.S. 9, 14–15 (1962) 
(holding that NLRA Section 7 protects spontaneous walkout by at-will employees 
in protest of frigid cold working conditions). 
 111 See, e.g., Eastex, Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 437 U.S. 556, 565–67 (1978) (holding 
that employer unlawfully prevented employees from distributing at the workplace 
union newsletter criticizing presidential veto of minimum wage law). 
 112 See, e.g., Petrochem Insulation, Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 240 F.3d 26, 30–31 (D.C. 
Cir. 2001) (upholding Board’s determination that filing environmental objections 
to nonunion company’s construction and zoning applications constitutes Section 
7 protected activity because its purpose was to force that company to pay area 
standard wages, which would in turn benefit union workers in the area by increas-
ing job opportunities and augmenting bargaining power). 
 113 See N.L.R.B. v. J. Weingarten, Inc., 420 U.S. 251, 260–64 (1975). 
 114 See Eastex, Inc., 437 U.S. at 565–70 (holding that employer unlawfully 
prevented employees from distributing at the workplace union newsletter urging 
workers to write to their state representatives to oppose incorporating state right-
to-work statute into state constitution). 
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that the employee reasonably believes may result in discipline;115 to 
invoke contractual rights under a collective-bargaining agree-
ment;116 and to utilize the Board’s processes to vindicate Section 7 
rights.117 It is in these senses that Section 7 is the labor analogue to 
political rights. 
These predominantly procedural labor rights are not to be con-
fused with the situation where a labor union flexes its political 
power. For example, in South Africa, black trade unions wielded 
political power to oppose apartheid: 
The development of black trade unionism in the late 
apartheid era occurred in the context of opposition to 
racist and authoritarian workplace regimes. Its power 
derived from its ability to organise and to render first 
the workplace and then the country ‘ungovernable.’ 
In short, the militant unionism of this period, its abil-
ity to unite black workers and the influence it exer-
cised in the rest of society, was a product of racial 
despotism in general, compounded by employer in-
transigence and state repression.118 
The “right” of black trade unions in apartheid South Africa to 
engage in such protests is reminiscent of the “right” of unions in the 
U.S. to protest poor wages, hours, and working conditions when the 
union is seeking legislative change from the government.119 Think 
of the protests of public sector workers in Wisconsin who sat in pro-
test of Governor Scott Walker’s legislative initiatives to strip those 
workers of their collective bargaining rights.120 Those actions start 
to look political in nature. 
                                                                                                             
 115 See, e.g., J. Weingarten, Inc., 420 U.S. at 262–64. 
 116 See, e.g., N.L.R.B. v. City Disposal Sys., Inc., 465 U.S. 822, 831–37 
(1984). 
 117 See 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(4) (2012); see generally N.L.R.B. v. Scrivener, 405 
U.S. 117, 121–26 (1972). 
 118 SAKHELA BUHLUNGU, The State of Trade Unions in Post-Apartheid South 
Africa, in STATE OF THE NATION: SOUTH AFRICA 2003–2004 185 (John Daniel et 
al. eds., HSRC Press 2003). 
 119 See supra notes 107–117 and accompanying text. 
 120 See Monica Davey & Steven Greenhouse, Angry Demonstrations in Wis-
consin as Cuts Loom, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 16, 2011), http://www.ny-
times.com/2011/02/17/us/17wisconsin.html. 
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That traditional labor rights tend to be procedural rights in fur-
therance of economic rights also does not mean that substantive 
rights for workers are absent from the legal landscape.121 Such sub-
stantive rights are typically not called labor rights in the U.S. We 
have different labels for them. “Civil rights” is the term we use when 
speaking of Title VII’s prohibition on workplace discrimination and 
harassment.122 The Fair Labor Standards Act’s minimum wage and 
maximum hour provisions typically fall into the category of socio-
economic rights.123 Health and safety laws under the Occupational 
Safety and Health Act might be viewed as social rights.124 Whatever 
we call them, they constitute, in theory, the basic floor of rights upon 
which all workers are entitled to walk. All too often in the U.S., that 
floor of rights is also a ceiling and sometimes a drop ceiling, below 
which workers’ often find themselves. 
T.H. Marshall makes a similar observation: “Trade unionism 
has . . . created a secondary system of industrial citizenship parallel 
with and supplementary to the system of political citizenship.”125 It 
is through this industrial citizenship and system of industrial democ-
racy where workers can fight for some of the things that matter most 
to them as U.S. citizens—job security with a living wage and good 
working conditions.126 
                                                                                                             
 121 See Angie Cowan Hamada, The NLRA: A Real Class Act: Employees’ Sub-
stantive NLRA Right to Pursue Concerted Legal Action, A.B.A. SEC. LAB. & EMP. 
L. 1, 7 (Mar. 4, 2015), http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/events/labor
_law/2015/march/dll/hamada.authcheckdam.pdf. 
 122 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (2012).   
 123 29 U.S.C. §§ 206, 207 (2012). 
 124 29 U.S.C. §§ 651–78 (2012). 
 125 MARSHALL, supra note 77, at 94. 
 126 Professor Guy Mundlak reads Marshall as suggesting three themes tying 
labor with citizenship: “[T]he importance of labor market institutions (most nota-
bly — trade unions), their distinct position in comparison to end-norms (labor 
standards), and the importance of active participation.” Guy Mundlak, Industrial 
Citizenship, Social Citizenship, Corporate Citizenship: I Just Want My Wages, 8 
THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 719, 724 (2007). 
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IV. A TALE OF TWO CITIES:127 A POSITIVE LAW AND NATURAL 
LAW ACCOUNT OF WORKERS’ HUMAN RIGHTS 
To assess a legal system’s record on human rights, it is useful, if 
not necessary, to compare laws and/or legal practices within a spe-
cific jurisdiction to a human rights standard. In this Article, I am 
interested in comparing U.S. labor law to two such standards: (1) 
positive law, by which I mean well-established, well-respected in-
ternational labor standards; and (2) natural law, by which I mean 
law cognizable through reason and derived from human nature, 
which would universally apply to all humans. To clarify, my argu-
ment is two-tiered. In Section IV.A and IV.B, I examine some an-
swers to the question, “What are human rights?” In Section V, I ex-
amine answers to the question, “What human rights standards guide 
(positive law) or should guide (natural law) labor law?” 
To clarify, Section IV describes standards. In Section IV.A, I 
examine positive human rights both as a concept and as they exist. I 
do not develop a theory of what positive law is. I am only interested 
in identifying (Sections IV.A.1 and A.2) and then applying (Section 
IV.A.3) well-established, well-respected international human rights 
standards to U.S. labor law for purposes of assessing how they com-
pare with these positive human-rights standards.128 By contrast, in 
Section IV.B, I do attempt to develop a comprehensive natural law 
definition of human rights. Admittedly, this is confusing because 
natural law has traditionally influenced the positive law of human 
rights. But the two projects are distinct. One ultimately compares 
                                                                                                             
 127 This reference, although apropos of Charles Dickens’ book by the same 
name, is intended to evoke images of the SAINT AUGUSTINE, THE CITY OF GOD 3 
(Marcus Dods trans., Random House, Inc. 1993). In that book, St. Augustine com-
pares human laws and culture of the Roman Empire to the ideal society in which 
God’s laws rule. While there is a struggle between the two, the City of God will 
ultimately prevail. Id. at 3–5, 38–39. 
 128 For purposes of this paper I am not interested in the questions that the late-
twentieth century legal philosophers tried to answer. For my purposes, whether 
the law is a sovereign’s command backed by threat of sanction or whether law is 
a system of primary and secondary rules is irrelevant to my immediate goals – to 
identify legal rules that govern particular circumstances, a task that lawyers un-
derstand and perform routinely. Compare JOHN AUSTIN, THE PROVINCE OF 
JURISPRUDENCE DETERMINED AND THE USES OF THE STUDY OF JURISPRUDENCE 
XXV-XXIX (Isaiah Berlin et al. eds., The Curwen Press 1954) (1832) with H.L.A. 
HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 213–26 (Penelope A. Bullock & Joseph Raz eds., 
2d ed. 1994). 
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U.S. labor laws to international human rights laws129 and the other 
develops a natural law theory of human rights that establishes    
standards by which to judge U.S. labor law.130 
A. Comparing U.S. Labor Law to International Human Rights Law 
1. STANDARD: THE U.N. DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS 
PROMOTES HUMAN RIGHTS AS UNIVERSAL, INALIENABLE, 
INDIVISIBLE, INTERDEPENDENT, AND NON-DISCRIMINATORY 
According to the U.N. Office for the High Commission on Hu-
man Rights: “Human rights are rights inherent to all human beings, 
whatever our nationality, place of residence, sex, national or ethnic 
origin, colour, religion, language, or any other status. We are all 
equally entitled to our human rights without discrimination. These 
rights are all interrelated, interdependent and indivisible.” 131 
The following accepted characteristics of human rights are all 
present here: 
(1) Universal – “Human rights are rights inherent in 
all human beings.”132 
(2) Inalienable – “We are all equally entitled to our 
human rights . . . .”133 
(3) Indivisible and Interdependent – “These rights 
are all interrelated, interdependent and invisible.”134 
(4) Non-discriminatory – “We are all equally entitled 
to our human rights without discrimination.”135 
                                                                                                             
 129 For an excellent description of the positivist approach to human rights, see 
Virginia Mantouvalou, Are Labour Rights Human Rights?, 3 EUR. LAB. L. J. 151, 
152–56 (2012). 
 130 This approach to labor rights is rare, although it is the approach that I favor. 
For a recent survey of the literature on this point, see id. at 163–69. 
 131 What are Human Rights?, UNITED NATIONS HUMAN RIGHTS: OFFICE OF 
THE HIGH COMM’R, http://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/Pages/WhatareHumanRi
ghts.aspx (last visited Jan. 24, 2016). 
 132 Id. (emphasis added). 
 133 Id. (emphasis added). 
 134 Id. 
 135 Id. 
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The text of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights’ Pream-
ble also promotes all four of these characteristics: 
Whereas recognition of the inherent dignity and of 
the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the 
human family is the foundation of freedom, justice 
and peace in the world, 
Whereas disregard and contempt for human rights 
have resulted in barbarous acts which have outraged 
the conscience of mankind, and the advent of a world 
in which human beings shall enjoy freedom of 
speech and belief and freedom from fear and want 
has been proclaimed as the highest aspiration of the 
common people . . . .136 
That the U.N. General Assembly in this Declaration views hu-
man rights as universal, inalienable, and non-discriminatory is pa-
tently obvious from the plain language of the first clause, which rec-
ognizes the “inherent dignity” and the “inalienable” and “equal” 
rights of “all members of the human family.”137  The use of the terms 
inherent and all reveal the universal character of human rights. That 
humans hold these inalienable rights equally tells us that we all hold 
them permanently and that no one is more entitled to them than an-
other.138 The use of the phrase inherent dignity strengthens the sig-
nificance of the permanent and nondiscriminatory status of these 
rights. 
That human rights are indivisible and interdependent—that 
these rights reinforce one another in the sense that the whole is 
greater than the sum of its parts—comes from a contextual reading 
of the text. The first paragraph posits that state recognition of human 
rights is the “foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the 
world.”139 The Preamble proceeds in the second paragraph to claim 
                                                                                                             
 136 G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, preamble, Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
(Dec. 10, 1948). 
 137 See id. (emphasis added). 
 138 See id. 
 139 Id. 
602 UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 71:565 
 
that “disregard and contempt for human rights have resulted in bar-
barous acts which have outraged the conscience of mankind[.]”140 
That same paragraph then proclaims a universal goal of humanity to 
create “a world” enjoying certain freedoms, including the “freedom 
from fear.”141 The question is, of course, what rights, other than free-
dom of speech and belief, which the Preamble specifically mentions, 
when taken together, would create a world free from fear? Freedom 
of speech and belief, alone, are not sufficient. If life is a basic human 
right, then humans need subsistence in the form of food, water, shel-
ter, and clothing. 
2. OTHER CHARACTERISTICS: THE EXTENT TO WHICH 
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW PROTECTS INDIVIDUAL OR 
COLLECTIVE RIGHTS AND OTHER STICKY ISSUES 
In addition to these characteristics, we can ask whether these 
rights are: 
 
 Individual, collective, or both? 
 Weighty or insignificant when weighed against other 
rights? 
 Sundry or few? 
 Aspirational or minimal? 
 Moral, legal, or political? 
 Ideal or pragmatic? 
 
U.S. labor law thinkers have long noticed the tension between 
labor rights, which have been constructed (at least originally) as col-
lective rights, and civil rights against workplace discrimination, 
which have been constructed as individual rights.142 Indeed, labor 
rights have found only a hostile home in the U.S. in part because of 
their collective nature, which does not intuitively fit into the robustly 
individualistic and liberty-loving American culture.143 
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 141 Id. (emphasis added). 
 142 See generally Hamada, supra note 121, at 8. 
 143 See generally The Persistence of Union, supra note 26. 
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But there is nothing unique about labor rights such that they 
must be construed as collective rights. Section 7 rights144 illustrate 
this point. The rights to join a union or to refrain from joining a      
union belong to the individual.145 The right to call a strike belongs 
to the union, at least under the NLRA.146 Now, what if it is possible 
for either the individual or the union to hold the right. The right to 
strike illustrates the point. As explained above, the right to strike is 
often construed under U.S. law as a collective right insofar as the 
union calls the strike. But surely the law could have developed such 
that the individual held the right to strike in the sense that the indi-
vidual could withhold his or her labor whether or not the union 
called a strike. Indeed, such a legal system could accommodate both 
the individual right to strike and the collective right to strike. In such 
a system, a conflict between the individual (who wants to go on 
strike) and the union (which does not), or visa versa, might have to 
be resolved.147 
Whether human rights are sufficiently substantial to outweigh 
other rights is both a legal and a moral question, which depends in 
part upon the significance of the rights involved.148 As a matter of 
legal reality, judges are trained to balance rights.149 Whether they 
get that balance right or wrong has legal, political, and moral dimen-
sions.150 For example, some might think that there is a legally cor-
rect balance between radio personality Rush Limbaugh’s right to 
freely broadcast that Bella Abzug, Betty Friedan, Anita Hill, Pat 
Schroeder, Eleanor Smeal, Gloria Steinem, and Molly Yard are 
“feminazis”—meaning a type of feminist who is committing a mod-
ern-day Holocaust by supporting abortion rights—and the right of 
these women not to be slandered.151 The political dimensions to this 
                                                                                                             
 144 29 U.S.C. § 157 (2012). 
 145 Id. 
 146 Id. 
 147 See Emporium Capwell Co. v. W. Addition, Cmty. Org., 420 U.S. 50, 52, 
76 (1975). 
 148 See Gross, supra note 76, at 3–4. 
 149 See Ronald Dworkin, Hard Cases, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1057, 1058 (1975). 
 150 See id. 
 151 A young Ronald Dworkin’s “The Right Thesis” comes to mind here. See 
id. at 1063–64 (arguing that judges should determine the right answer in hard 
cases by determining which proposed solution better fits the case law); Ronald 
Dworkin, No Right Answer?, 53 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 2 (1978). 
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question are more obvious. Those who sincerely believe that abor-
tion is morally reprehensible are more likely to view Limbaugh’s 
free speech rights as weightier than the women’s rights to maintain 
their reputation. Pornography might afford a better example here. 
Those who view pornography as harmful to women because of its 
ostensibly degrading nature are less likely to consider the right to 
produce, distribute, possess, or view pornography as a weighty free 
speech right. 
Furthermore, the number of human rights is both a political 
question and a moral question.152 It’s a political question in two 
ways. First, a sovereign nation’s legislative body may be tasked with 
enacting positive law, including laws protecting human rights.     
Second, a group of sovereign nations may sign treaties agreeing that 
certain rights count as human rights. 
But just how many human rights there are can also be formulated 
as a moral question. For example, Harvard Professor John Rawls 
(1921–2002) wrote that human rights are: 
[A] special class of rights of universal application 
and hardly controversial in their general intention. 
They are part of a reasonable law of peoples and 
specify limits on the domestic institutions required of 
all peoples by that law. In this sense they specify the 
outer boundary of admissible domestic law of socie-
ties in good standing in a just society of peoples.153 
Rawls added that human rights play three roles: they legitimize 
the legal order, they justify military or economic sanctions if vio-
lated, and they “‘set a moral limit to pluralism.’”154 Rawls concedes 
that only a few rights – the “right to life, liberty, and security in per-
son”; freedom from torture, could ever meet this definition.155 He 
                                                                                                             
 152 See Gross, supra note 76, at 3, 14. 
 153 John Rawls, The Law of Peoples, 20 CRITICAL INQUIRY 36, 59 (1993) (em-
phasis added). 
 154 Id. (quoting David Luban, The Romance of the Nation State, 9 PHIL. & PUB. 
AFFAIRS 392, 396 (1980)). 
 155 Rawls, supra note 153, at 59 n.45 (adding that the conventions against   
genocide and apartheid implicate human rights). See also Joseph Raz, Human 
Rights Without Foundations, in THE PHILOSOPHY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 332 
(Samantha Besson & John Tasioulas eds., Oxford U. Press 2010) (expressing con-
cern about the proliferation of rights classified as human rights). 
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then views other human rights (e.g., dignity, social security, equal 
pay) as “liberal aspirations.”156 
For my purposes, there are two classes (“cities”) of human 
rights. First are positive human rights—those enacted by legislation 
or agreed upon by treaty (or possibly developed by the common 
law). Second, are natural human rights—those that exist indepen-
dent of legal action. Whether positive human rights are individual, 
collective, or weighty, and whether or not they are few or many is 
merely a function of figuring out what the law is at any given mo-
ment in time in any given culture. To the extent that positive and 
natural human rights don’t match, natural human rights are those to 
which we aspire. In my view, human rights should be individual or 
collective, but they must be weighty. Human rights should also be 
more common than Rawls would advocate, but the number of them 
would be limited by their significance. However, it does not make 
sense to me to think in terms of the number of human rights. Rather 
a values-based approach to human rights allows us to generate many 
different kinds of rights dependent on the type of society in which 
we live.157 In this way, positive and natural human rights will even-
tually align.158 
3. THE MODERN INTERNATIONAL LABOR COMMUNITY CONSIDERS 
FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION, ABOLITION OF SLAVERY AND CHILD 
LABOR, AND FREEDOM FROM DISCRIMINATION IN THE WORKPLACE 
TO BE HUMAN RIGHTS 
The League of Nations, the brainchild of U.S. President Wood-
row Wilson,159 was founded in 1919 as part of the Treaty of Ver-
sailles,160 ending World War I.161 The purpose of establishing the 
                                                                                                             
 156 Rawls, supra note 153, at 59 n.45. 
 157 See, e.g., Vanishing Employee, supra note 65, at 500. 
 158 See id. 
 159 See NOBEL LECTURES: PEACE 1926–1950 (Frederick W. Haberman ed., 
World Scientific Publishing Co., 1991) According to the Nobel Peace Prize ad-
dress, the Committee awarded President Wilson the Nobel Peace Prize “because 
in his celebrated Fourteen Points the President of the United States has succeeded 
in bringing a design for a fundamental law of humanity into present-day interna-
tional politics.” Id. (emphasis added). 
 160 Treaty of Versailles, pt. 1, June 28, 1919, 2 U.S.T.I.A. 43. 
 161 See id. The idea of linking peace with some sort of international organiza-
tion appears to go back as far as the Enlightenment. For example, Immanuel Kant 
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League of Nations was “to promote international co-operation and 
to achieve international peace and security.”162 The idea was to pro-
mote peace through collective action—political, economic, social, 
and military.163 Article 23 of the League of Nations’ Covenant made 
two promises with regard to labor: 
Subject to and in accordance with the provisions of 
international conventions . . . the Members of the 
League: 
(a) will endeavour to secure and maintain fair and 
humane conditions of labour for men, women, and 
children, both in their own countries and in all coun-
tries to which their commercial and industrial rela-
tions extend, and for that purpose will establish and 
maintain the necessary international organisa-
tions . . . . 
(c) will entrust the League with the general supervi-
sion over the execution of agreements with regard to 
the traffic in women and children . . . .164 
At the same time, as part of the same treaty that ended World 
War I and in partial fulfillment of these promises, the International 
Labour Organization was created, “to reflect the belief that universal 
and lasting peace can be accomplished only if it is based on social 
justice.”165 The ILO Constitution identified the following areas of 
improvement that it deemed necessary for universal and lasting 
peace: 
                                                                                                             
advocates for a “league of nations,” in which all sovereigns would “enter . . . into 
a constitution similar to the civil constitution.” IMMANUEL KANT, PERPETUAL 
PEACE: A PHILOSOPHICAL SKETCH (1795), https://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/in-
trel/kant/kant1.htm. This paper does not purport to trace the history of this linkage, 
although such a study would be useful. 
 162 Treaty of Versailles, supra note 160, at 48. 
 163 See id. 
 164 Treaty of Versailles, supra note 160, art. 23 at 57. 
 165 Int’l Labour Organization [ILO], Origins and History, 
http://www.ilo.org/global/about-the-ilo/history/lang--en/index.htm (last visited 
Mar. 7, 2017). 
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· the regulation of the hours of work, including 
the establishment of a maximum working day 
and week[;] 
· the regulation of labour supply, [and] the pre-
vention of unemployment[;] 
· the provision of an adequate living wage[;] 
· the protection of the worker against sickness, 
disease and injury arising out of his employ-
ment[;] 
· the protection of children, young persons and 
women[;] 
· provision for old age and injury[;] 
· protection of the interests of workers when 
employed in countries other than their own[;] 
· recognition of the principle of equal remuner-
ation for work of equal value[;] 
· recognition of the principle of freedom of as-
sociation[;] 
· the organization of vocational and technical 
education, and other measures . . . .166 
These areas of improvement, which focus on social and eco-
nomic rights—wages; hours; social security provisions for children, 
the elderly, the disabled, and the unemployed; immigration; discrim-
ination; and job training/education—remain relevant today.167 
More international organizations were established in the after-
math of World War II. Most prominently, on October 24, 1945, the 
United Nations was founded to replace the League of Nations.168 On 
                                                                                                             
 166 Int’l Labour Organization [ILO], ILO Constitution, http://www.ilo.org/
dyn/normlex/en/f?p=1000:62:0::NO:62:P62_LIST_ENTRIE_ID:2453907:NO 
(last visited Mar. 7, 2017). 
 167 See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. §§ 157, 158(d). 
 168 United Nations, History of the United Nations, http://www.un.org/en/sec-
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December 10, 1948, the UN General Assembly adopted what has 
come to be known as the first international instrument on human 
rights, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights [UDHR].169 Ar-
ticle 1 proclaimed that: “All human beings are born free and equal 
in dignity and rights. They are endowed with reason and conscience 
and should act towards one another in a spirit of brotherhood.”170 
The UDHR’s assertion—that humans are “equal in dignity” to one 
another—and the additional assertion that humans are special be-
cause they are “endowed with reason and conscience”—are com-
mon Enlightenment themes (with even earlier roots).171 
Notwithstanding this strong endorsement of fundamental human 
rights in the mid-twentieth century and notwithstanding the belief 
that peace is inextricably linked to social and economic prosperity 
and parity, it wasn’t until fairly recently, in 1998, that the ILO 
adopted the Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at 
Work.172 In this declaration, the ILO named the following four fun-
damental work rights: 
(a) freedom of association and the effective recogni-
tion of the right to collective bargaining; 
(b) the elimination of all forms of forced or compul-
sory labour; 
(c) the effective abolition of child labour; and 
(d) the elimination of discrimination in respect of 
employment and occupation.173 
In the U.S., our positive law fares well—at least at first blush.174 
Several statutes protect worker freedom of association, including the 
                                                                                                             
 169 G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Dec. 10, 
1948). 
 170 See id. at art. 1. 
 171 See generally KANT, infra note 189, at 38. 
 172 See Int’l Labour Organization [ILO], ILO Declaration on Fundamental 
Principles and Rights at Work and its Follow-up (June 15, 2010), http://www.ilo
.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---ed_norm/---declaration/documents/publication/wc
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 173 Id. at 7. 
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National Labor Relations Act,175 the Railway Labor Act,176 the Fed-
eral Labor Relations Act,177 and many state constitutions and legis-
lative acts.178 The Thirteenth Amendment officially ended slavery 
in the U.S.: 
Section 1. Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, 
except as a punishment for crime whereof the party 
shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the 
United States, or any place subject to their jurisdic-
tion. 
Section 2. Congress shall have power to enforce this 
article by appropriate legislation.179 
Congress has passed statutes to enforce this amendment, most 
recently, the Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 
2000.180 Further, Congress abolished child labor when it enacted the 
Fair Labor Standards Act.181 Congress has endeavored to eliminate 
workplace discrimination with the passage of a series of statutes 
since the 1960s, including, for example, the Equal Pay Act of 
1963,182 Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,183 the Age Dis-
crimination in Employment Act of 1967,184 and the Americans with 
Disabilities Act of 1990.185 
In the U.S., few would argue with the proposition that freedom 
from forced labor and any kind of child labor constitute human 
                                                                                                             
 175 29 U.S.C. §§ 151–169 (2012). 
 176 Railway Labor Act, ch. 347, §§ 2, 44 Stat. 577 (1926) (codified as amended 
in scattered sections of 45 U.S.C.). 
 177 Civil Service Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-454, §§ 701 et. seq., 92 
Stat. 1111 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 5 U.S.C.). 
 178 See generally MARTIN H. MALIN ET AL., PUBLIC SECTOR EMPLOYMENT: 
CASES AND MATERIALS 89 (2d ed. 2010). 
 179 U.S. CONST. amend. XIII. 
 180 Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 
106-386, §§ 101, 1001, 114 Stat. 1464 (codified as amended in scattered sections 
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rights. Some might argue against the idea that freedom from work-
place discrimination is a human right, but those few might at least 
concede that it is a civil right, as the full name of the Title VII statute 
(the Civil Rights Act)186 suggests. But there is currently no consen-
sus regarding whether the status of freedom of association, as ap-
plied to workers, constitutes a human right.187 The Republican Party 
platform advances the position that unions are harmful to businesses 
because they increase labor costs.188 It promises, for example, to 
eliminate card check, eliminate Project Labor Agreements, and to 
circumvent collective bargaining by permitting employers to unilat-
erally raise wages for select employees.189 The promise to circum-
vent collective bargaining would essentially eviscerate freedom of 
association. Given the political landscape, it is difficult to claim with 
a straight face that the U.S. views worker freedom of association as 
a human right, notwithstanding the positive law’s protection of that 
freedom. 
B. Deconstructing Human Rights 
1. DECONSTRUCTING THE CONCEPT OF “HUMAN” IN HUMAN 
RIGHTS: KANT’S CATEGORICAL IMPERATIVE’S HUMANITY 
FORMULATION 
Perhaps the most persuasive and influential Enlightenment 
thinker to espouse the view that there is something dignified about 
humanity is Immanuel Kant (1724–1804).190 Kant posited that there 
is one fundamental law of morality—the categorical imperative.191 
                                                                                                             
 186 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (2012). 
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In Kant’s view, all other laws of morality derive from the categorical 
imperative (CI).192 
Although at some point Kant succinctly defined CI as “a law for 
every will of a rational being,”193 Kant thought that his CI could be 
expressed in several different ways. The first formulation, known as 
the law of nature, tells us to act in accordance with principles that 
could become a universal rule of law that all members of your soci-
ety (universality) would accept: “So act as if the maxim of your ac-
tion were to become through your will a universal law of nature.”194 
To determine whether an action violates the categorical imperative, 
simply ask yourself what would happen if everyone were to follow 
the proposed principle. If the answer to that question is something 
like, “It is possible for everyone to act in accordance with this rule 
and the rule would never contradict itself,” then the proposed rule 
meets the test of the categorical imperative. One of the most com-
mon examples of a proposed rule that fails the categorical impera-
tive is the principle of deception. Kant gives the example of the per-
son who lies to borrow money knowing that he cannot pay it back.195 
That person acts in accordance with the following principle: “If I 
believe myself to be in pecuniary distress, then I will borrow money 
and promise to pay it back, although I know this will never hap-
pen.”196 To determine whether this principle is morally right, one 
must simply universalize the law.197 In rejecting the maxim of de-
ception Kant observes: “I see right away that it could never be valid 
as a universal law of nature and still agree with itself, but rather it 
would necessarily contradict itself because eventually no one could 
rely on promises that are routinely broken.198 
Before moving to the CI’s second formulation, it is instructive 
to briefly discuss CI’s third and fourth formulations—the autonomy 
principle and the kingdom of ends, which further universalizes 
Kant’s first formulation of the categorical imperative.199 The third 
formulation, known as the principle of autonomy, tells us that we 
                                                                                                             
 192 See id. at 36–37. 
 193 Id. at 50. 
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should always act as if we are making universal rules: Act as “a will 
legislating universally through all its maxims[.]”200 Similarly, the 
fourth formulation, known as the kingdom of ends, tells us to act as 
if we were the legal official of some universal law-making body: 
“Act in accordance with maxims of a universally legislative member 
for a merely possible realm of ends . . . .”201 
It is the categorical imperative’s second formulation, known as 
the principle of ends, the principle of dignity, or the humanity prin-
ciple, where Kant seems to add something more.202 Kant’s humanity 
principle tells us to treat people as if each person has intrinsic value 
simply because each person is human: “Act so that you use human-
ity, as much in your own person as in the person of every other, 
always at the same time as an end and never merely as a means.”203 
The humanity principle forbids us to act in ways that exploit human 
beings or at least in ways that merely exploit human beings.204 Pre-
sumably, hiring workers per se does not violate the CI even though 
the employer uses its workers in furtherance of its purposes. The 
moral question inherent in a natural human rights approach to work-
ers’ rights is whether these workers are being used merely as a 
means. Those interested in workers’ rights must determine whether, 
as a matter of fact (as opposed to a matter of law), workers are actu-
ally being used in an exploitative manner. This is essentially an em-
pirical assessment of the moral claim: Are institutions, which are 
designed to protect workers, doing their job? It is also a legal strat-
egy for developing positive labor standards, which reflect a particu-
lar conception of human dignity and autonomy while minimizing 
the impact of state and business coercion of workers.205 This partic-
ular formulation of the CI further and most clearly shows how the 
CI is in tension with political (or even economic) utilitarianism, by 
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which majority rule governs and the ends justify the means.206 Mo-
rality requires that when people act we consider the humanity of 
each person and the effect of our actions on others’ humanity.207 
2. DECONSTRUCTING THE CONCEPT OF “RIGHTS” IN HUMAN RIGHTS 
i. Varying Conceptions of a Legal Right Under Hohfeld’s Rubric 
The concept of a legal right has many formulations or concep-
tions.208 Perhaps the greatest twentieth-century thinker regarding le-
gal-rights discourse is Professor Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld (1879–
1918), who carefully distinguished among these varying concep-
tions of legal rights.209 Professor Hohfeld devised a rubric to remedy 
his complaint that the legal term, “right,” was being used by judges 
in a sloppy and inconsistent manner.210 Hohfeld comprehensively 
deconstructed the concept of rights into four different conceptions: 
claims, privileges, powers, and immunities.211 Here, I focus on what 
Hohfeld calls the claim right.212 
ii. Claim Rights Entail Rights Holders, Duty Holders, Interests, 
and Values 
According to Professor Hohfeld, “[a] duty or a legal obligation 
is that which one ought or ought not to do . . . .When a right is in-
vaded, a duty is violated.”213 In other words, where there’s a right 
there’s a correlative duty, to use Hohfeldian lingo.214 Hohfeld used 
an example from property law to explain this conception of a claim 
                                                                                                             
 206 See id. at 161–62. 
 207 See KANT, supra note 190, at 46–47. 
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right: “if X has a right against Y that he shall stay off the former’s 
land, the correlative (and equivalent) is that Y is under a duty toward 
X to stay off the place.”215 
The idea of claim holders and duty holders logically follows 
from Hohfeld’s analysis of claim rights.216 However, it is Professor 
Joseph Raz who crystallized this aspect of the formulation: “‘X has 
a right’ if and only if X can have rights, and, other things being 
equal, an aspect of X’s well-being (his interest) is a sufficient reason 
for holding some other person(s) to be under a duty.”217 This means 
that there are always several important variables when analyzing 
claim rights.218 First there is capacity: who is the rights holder and 
who is the duty holder?219 Then there is the nature of the right, which 
is based on interests and values.220 
iii. The Claim Right: Where There’s a Right, There’s a Duty 
According to Raz, “[r]ights are grounds of duties in others. The 
duties grounded in a right may be conditional.”221 To illustrate his 
point, Raz uses an example from the workplace: 
Consider the duty of an employee to obey his em-
ployer’s instructions concerning the execution of his 
job. It is grounded in the employer’s right to instruct 
his employees. But it is a conditional duty, i.e., a duty 
(in matters connected with one’s employment) to 
perform an action if instructed by the employer to do 
so. When the condition which activates the duty is an 
action of some person, and when the duty is condi-
tional on it because it is in the right-holder’s interest 
to make that person able to activate the duty at will, 
then the right confers a power on the person on 
whose behaviour the duty depends.222 
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Raz’s example shows that the employee’s duty to obey her em-
ployer is grounded in the employer’s right to direct its employees.223 
Raz is a legal positivist. So his example does not mean to connote 
that employers have some sort of fundamental or natural right to 
obedience from their employees.224 His example, however, is highly 
descriptive of, for example, American employment law, which rou-
tinely places the duty of obedience on employees.225 Indeed, insub-
ordination—the failure to obey an employer’s instructions—is a 
common cause of discharge in the U.S.226 This value is so embedded 
in U.S. culture that when one private law school in Michigan re-
cently fired a tenured member of its faculty for refusing to teach 
constitutional law, a subject she had never taught before and was 
likely incompetent to teach, the law school won.227 
iv. Legal Capacity 
According to Raz, “[a]n individual is capable of having rights if 
and only if either his well-being is of ultimate value or he is an ‘ar-
tificial person’ . . . .”228 The example of an artificial person that Raz 
gives is the corporation.229 Once again, Raz’s positivism comes 
through in so far as he notes that an artificial person—something 
other than a being of ultimate value—is capable of possessing 
rights.230 For Raz, capacity is something that is granted by the posi-
tive law.231 
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Raz’s definition is problematic insofar as it includes artificial 
persons.232 To be sure, Raz is descriptively correct in identifying ar-
tificial persons as entities that have legal capacity under positive 
law.233 Indeed, in our world as it is currently organized, business 
entities such as corporations and workers’ rights institutions, such 
as unions, have legal capacity and therefore can possess legal 
rights.234 But in a world that is changing rapidly and at an exponen-
tial rate, there may be a time in which we are confronted with the 
question whether other entities, such as robotic cars or robotic peo-
ple have legal rights.235 Relatedly, the definition does not, at least at 
first blush, account for animal rights—an important subject in labor 
law to the extent that animals may be used by humans as beasts of 
burden.236 
v. Nature of Rights 
In a democratic republic, like the U.S., positive rights come 
about through the political process.237 This often means compromise 
among competing groups based on the interests of those natural and 
artificial persons.238 Accordingly, “the nature and extent of any legal 
right is only a reflection of the value attached by the political system 
to various, often conflicting, interests.”239 It is therefore instructive 
to examine those various interests and to understand the values un-
derlying those interests to fully describe the nature of legal rights 
                                                                                                             
 232 See MORALITY OF FREEDOM, supra note 208, at 166. 
 233 See, e.g., Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 343. 
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and to determine whether a change in policy is needed to better ful-
fill the desired interests and values.240 In other words, using the ideas 
of Professors Hohfeld and Raz as guides, we can see a relationship 
among legal claim rights, interests, and values. 
If this is correct—that rights are based on interests and grounded 
in values—then are rights only substantively valid when they are 
grounded in morally sound values? Imagine a circumstance under 
which a law is properly promulgated in accordance with what Pro-
fessor H.L.A. Hart (1907–1992) called a sovereign nation’s second-
ary rules.241 A member of the House of Representatives introduces 
a bill; that bill goes to committee, where it is revised; the bill is then 
reported to the House floor where it is debated; the bill is voted on; 
the same process takes place on the Senate-side of Congress.242 
Once the bill passes both houses in the same form, the bill is sent to 
the President, who then has three choices.243 The President can sign 
the bill, in which case it becomes law; the President can veto the bill, 
in which case the bill returns to Congress, where a two-thirds vote 
of both houses can override the President’s veto; or the President 
can do nothing, in which case the bill becomes law after ten days if 
Congress is in session; otherwise the bill does not become law.244 
Let’s also imagine that this law meets Professor Lon Fuller’s (1902–
1978) eight canons of law such that we would agree that there is an 
internal morality of the law.245 In other words, the law (1) is one of 
general application; (2) is published in the Federal Register and in 
the U.S. Code; (3) has statutory language that is clear, precise, and 
comprehensible so that people readily understand their legal rights 
and obligations; (4) does not contradict itself or any other U.S. law; 
(5) can be readily complied with; (6) is stable and cannot be changed 
without an act of Congress; (7) is not applied retroactively; and (8) 
                                                                                                             
 240 See MORALITY OF FREEDOM, supra note 208, at 166; Fundamental Legal 
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is administered and enforced as written.246 Let’s further suppose that 
the law conforms to that legal system’s basic norm under the Pure 
Theory of Law posited by Hans Kelsen (1881–1973),247 or is con-
sistent with that legal system’s rule of recognition, as Hart would 
say;248 in this case, the law was challenged, and the U.S. Supreme 
Court has upheld that law as constitutional. 
Even under these circumstances—where a law meets all the cri-
teria of Fuller’s internal morality,249 where the law conforms to Kel-
sen’s basic norm,250 and where that law is validly promulgated under 
that legal system’s secondary rules and rules of recognition—such a 
law may still be morally repugnant. Think of the Fugitive Slave 
Acts.251 Think of “separate but equal.”252 
Once again, there are easy and hard cases on the question of 
whether a positive law is so morally repugnant that perhaps it is not 
a law at all, or perhaps it is a law and should simply not be obeyed.253 
The Fugitive Slave Act is an easy case for twenty-first century 
Americans—at least on the question whether that law is morally re-
pugnant.254 But what about at-will employment, gender stereotyp-
ing, and outsourcing? My guess is that many would call these easy 
cases as well—easy because, in their view, these cases are not mor-
ally repugnant even if we might prefer a different solution. I do not 
                                                                                                             
 246 See id. at 39; see also H.L.A. Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law 
and Morals, 71 HARV. L. REV. 593. 595–96 (1958) [hereinafter Positivism]. 
 247 HANS KELSEN, PURE THEORY OF LAW 3–4 (Max Knight trans., Univ. of 
California Press, 2d ed. 1967). 
 248 See HART, supra note 241, at 92. 
 249 See FULLER, supra note 245, at 39, 44. 
 250 See KELSEN, supra note 247, at 3–4. 
 251 Congress passed two fugitive slave laws. See Fugitive Slave Act of 1793, 
ch. 7, 1 Stat. 302 (1793); Fugitive Slave Act of 1850, ch. 60, 9 Stat. 462 (1850). 
See also Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. 539, 666 (1842) (finding unconstitutional 
a state statute banning the return of fugitive slaves); Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 
U.S. 393, 394–96 (1857) (holding that slaves are not constitutional citizens but 
instead are chattel; that slaves cannot be made free by travelling into free territory; 
therefore, that the Missouri Compromise of 1850 is unconstitutional insofar as it 
deprives masters of their enslaved property when those slaves happen to be moved 
into free territory). 
 252 Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 552 (1896) (upholding the constitution-
ality of an 1890 Louisiana state law providing for segregated, separate but equal, 
railroad accommodations). 
 253 See, e.g., id. 
 254 See 1 Stat. 302; 9 Stat. 462. 
2017] WORKERS' RIGHTS AS NATURAL HUMAN RIGHTS 619 
 
share this view. For reasons discussed in Section V, these cases are 
at best morally ambiguous. 
C. Are Human Rights Simply the Sum of Human Plus Rights or Is 
the Sum Greater than the Whole? 
The definition provided above tells us that human rights are 
claim rights that humans possess because they are human.255 This 
definition is very formulistic and does not account for several pos-
sibilities, two of which I examine. First, might human rights simply 
be a term of art, such that when put together the sum is greater than 
its parts.256 Second, the term does not account for other types of 
rights such as privileges, powers, and immunities.257 While this is 
true, these other categories are not relevant. Powers and immunities, 
for example, are secondary rights258 that merely reveal whether the 
rights holder, A, has the power to alter B’s rights. If A has that right, 
we say that it has power. If A does not have that right, we say that 
B holds an immunity.259 
The first possibility—that the whole is greater than the sum of 
its parts—is a more difficult question, which I attempt to answer in 
the next section. For the remainder of this Article, I challenge the 
view that the U.S. work law status quo is morally acceptable. To do 
this, I need to get to the foundational level of work law. I have al-
ready begun this analysis by deconstructing what it means to possess 
rights. I now proceed to deconstruct what it means for workers to 
possess natural human rights independent of the positive law. 
V. FINDING NATURAL LAW THROUGH EMPATHY IN THE ORIGINAL 
POSITION 
Our tale of two cities recounts a world in which we can assess a 
legal system’s record on human rights against two different types of 
                                                                                                             
 255 See MORALITY OF FREEDOM, supra note 208, at 166; see also Fundamental 
Legal Conceptions, supra note 208, at 710, 716–17. 
 256 See What are Human Rights?, supra note 131. 
 257 See generally HART, supra note 241, at 79. 
 258 See id. 
 259 See Some Fundamental Conceptions, supra note 208, at 30; HART, supra 
note 241, at 78–79. 
620 UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 71:565 
 
standards: (1) positive law, for example, well-established, interna-
tional law principles; or (2) natural law, laws cognizable through 
reason and derived from human nature, which would universally ap-
ply to all humans. We can readily determine the positive law.260 The 
question is, what is the source of the natural law?261 The work of 
Professor John Rawls might provide guidance.262 
A. Rawls’s Theory of Justice Promises a Well-ordered Just Society 
Governed by Two Principles: Equality in the Assignment of Basic 
Rights/Duties and Socio-Economic Inequalities Permitted Only if 
They Do Not Make the WORM Worse Off 
In A Theory of Justice, Professor Rawls is concerned with estab-
lishing principles of justice in a well-ordered, nearly just, pluralist 
society peppered with inequality.263 Rawls understood that such so-
cieties are ordered, at least in part, by laws and that “laws . . . no 
matter how efficient and well-arranged must be reformed or abol-
ished if they are unjust.”264 The question Rawls presents is: How do 
we determine the principles by which society might be justly or-
dered?265 Answering this question is a particularly difficult task if, 
as Rawls observed, “[t]he justice of a social scheme depends essen-
tially on how fundamental rights and duties are assigned and on the 
economic opportunities and social conditions in the various sectors 
of society.”266 
To answer his question, Professor Rawls posits a thought exper-
iment where we are asked to imagine individuals in an “original po-
sition of equality” in which none of the actors in this “hypothetical 
situation . . . .knows his place in society, his class position or social 
status, nor does anyone know his fortune in the distribution of natu-
ral assets and abilities, his intelligence, strength, and the like.”267 In 
this original position, the parties are asked to choose “principles of 
justice” to govern their society “behind a veil of ignorance.”268 
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Rawls was concerned with the problems of inequalities based on 
factors other than merit: 
The intuitive notion here is that . . . [people] born into 
different positions have different expectations of life 
determined, in part, by the political system as well as 
by economic and social circumstances . . . .[T]he in-
stitutions of society favor certain starting places over 
others. These are especially deep inequalities. Not 
only are they pervasive, but they affect [the individ-
ual’s] initial chances in life; yet they cannot possibly 
be justified by an appeal to the notions of merit or 
desert. It is these inequalities, presumably inevitable 
in the basic structure of any society, to which the 
principles of social justice must in the first instance 
apply.”269 
John Rawls understood this truth: Starting points matter!270 
According to Rawls, those in the original position would choose 
the following two principles, famously known as the liberty and the 
difference principles: 
First: each person is to have an equal right to the most 
extensive scheme of equal basic liberties compatible 
with a similar scheme of liberties for others. 
Second: social and economic inequalities are to be 
arranged so that they are both (a) reasonably ex-
pected to be to everyone’s advantage, and (b) at-
tached to positions and offices open to all. 271 
Simply put, Rawls argues that those in the original position 
would choose a world where all people have equal access to the 
basic liberties—freedom of expression, freedom of association, 
                                                                                                             
 269 Id. at 7 (emphasis added). 
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freedom of religious exercise, among others; and where any distri-
bution or redistribution of wealth benefits all.272 
B. A Thought Experiment: The Veil of Empathy 
Now imagine individuals in a different “original position of 
equality” in which all of the actors in this “hypothetical situation” 
can experience every person’s “place in society, . . . class position 
or social status, . . . fortune in the distribution of natural assets and 
abilities, [] intelligence, strength, and the like.”273 In this position, 
the participants would still be under a veil of ignorance (that is, they 
would know nothing about who they are), but they would be able to 
walk in the shoes of every individual. Such a person would be able 
to empathize with every person.274 
Empathic participants behind a veil of ignorance would likely 
develop a theory of workplace justice where rules reflect autonomy 
and dignity, while minimizing employer coercion. What that work-
place might look like is described in the following section. 275 
The most common objection I have received to this thought ex-
periment is that the use of empathy, instead of ignorance, strength-
ens the objection to Rawls’ original thought experiment. Namely, 
humans cannot even imagine what it is like to be under a veil of 
ignorance, let alone under a veil of empathy.276 I am bothered by 
neither objection. In my several years teaching jurisprudence, I have 
met only two students who have claimed that they cannot imagine 
what it is like to be under the veil of ignorance. Every other student 
has felt that, with time and imagination, they can situate themselves 
under the veil of ignorance. The veil of empathy should be even eas-
ier as the following anecdote illustrates. When I was 11 years old, I 
earned a spot on my high school’s junior varsity diving team. Our 
best diver was a 17-year-old young black woman, who was a county 
and state diving champion. I watched her in awe as she sailed 
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through the air in perfect form and entered the water without a 
splash. One evening I had a dream that I was the best diver in the 
state. The only catch? I had to become black. I spent the next few 
days (in my dream) walking around as a black version of myself. 
My “friends” picked on me; told me that I was stupid; and bullied 
me in numerous ways. In the end, I chose to be myself—white and 
mediocre. In that dream, at the ripe old age of 11, I recognized that 
the world was unjust; that it was more unjust to black girls than to 
white girls; and that I was more comfortable being an invisible white 
girl than drawing attention to myself by being a talented athlete 
cloaked in black skin. I dreamt what it was like to be a black girl. 
Perhaps, as a blonde, blue-eyed, pale-skinned little girl, I could not 
completely feel the pain of racial discrimination, but I did come 
close to a type of empathy, without much effort. 
It is by now well-established that affective instruction, using 
emotions to reinforce learning, is an important objective of early ed-
ucation.277 Indeed, empathy can be defined as “an affective response 
more appropriate to another’s situation than one’s own.”278 The veil 
of empathy is designed to capture this intuition. 
VI. LEGITIMIZING THE WORKPLACE: BUILDING A JUST WORKPLACE 
ON FOUNDATIONAL VALUES 
A. Workers’ Rights as Human Rights279 
1. THE NATURE OF WORKERS’ RIGHTS AS HUMAN RIGHTS: THE 
AUTONOMOUS DIGNIFIED WORKER 
In Toward a Foundational Theory of Workers’ Rights: The Au-
tonomous Dignified Worker, I argue that there are two foundational 
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values for establishing a just workplace: autonomy and dignity, 
hence the name, the autonomous dignified worker.280 Borrowing 
heavily from Professor Raz’s definition of personal autonomy, I de-
fine worker autonomy as follows: “[t]he autonomous [worker] is a 
(part) author of [his or her work] life . . . .controlling, to some de-
gree, [his or her] own destiny . . . through successive decisions 
throughout [his or her life].”281  For Raz, “[a]utonomy is opposed to 
a life of coerced choices[.]”282 
Similarly, worker autonomy is opposed to unilateral decisions 
made by the employer and imposed on the worker, especially when 
the decisions affect the workers’ wages, hours, and other terms and 
conditions of employment.283 It “contrasts with a [work] life of no 
choices, or . . . without ever exercising one’s capacity to choose.”284 
To be autonomous, the following conditions must be met: (1) the 
worker must possess “the mental ability to identify work life influ-
ences”; (2) the worker must have “access to information sufficient 
to generate a range of options”; (3) the worker must be free from 
coercion; and (4) the worker must have access to “modes of partici-
pation that empower [him or her] to effect changes in” his or her 
work life.285 Mental capacity, information, independence, and par-
ticipation are the bare minimum workplace conditions that must be 
met for workers to possess some degree of autonomy in the work-
place.286 
The other foundational value for establishing a just workplace is 
dignity.287 In The Autonomous Dignified Worker, I define dignity as 
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follows: “The ruling idea behind the ideal of dignity is that individ-
ual members of a community should treat each and every other 
member of that community as persons of independent moral 
worth.”288 
I further note that “[a]s a right enforceable against the state, dig-
nity signifies in part that ‘individuals have a right to equal concern 
and respect in the design and administration of the political institu-
tions that govern them.’”289 Moreover, “[a]s a right enforceable 
against other institutions, such as employers or even unions, dignity 
demands that these institutions, created for the benefit of natural 
persons, treat their beneficiaries with equal concern and respect.”290 
Kant’s categorical imperative provides a more rigorous founda-
tion on which to build a just and dignified workplace.291 As ex-
plained above in Section IV.B.1., the categorical imperative—un-
derstood as a moral imperative, which commands us to act as if we 
are legal officials in a universal law-making body that always treats 
humans as ends and never merely as means—becomes a solid foun-
dation for a natural law conception of a human-rights platform for 
workers based on dignity.292 This principle essentially allows em-
ployers to employ human persons to work for them, but prohibits 
employers from treating those human workers merely as a means of 
making money.293 Instead, employers must consider the good of 
those humans who work for their firms.294 
There are at least three other values that labor advocates often 
advance as foundational values for the workplace—participation, 
democracy, and justice. By participation, I mean the meaningful op-
portunity to participate in decisions affecting one’s work life. Such 
participation could be accomplished through unions, works coun-
cils, quality circles, or through significant Board-level participation 
by workers. In general, I am referring to the voice function of these 
institutions. By democracy, I intend the meaningful opportunity to 
have equal say in such decisions. I am not only thinking of the one-
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person-one-vote concept in union elections. I am also thinking of 
participation in other voice institutions where the workers’ diverse 
voices are not diluted by the employer’s voice or the voices of other 
parties. For example, Board-level participation might also be char-
acterized as a democratic right, so long as the workers’ voice is not 
diluted by shareholder representatives. It is thus readily observed 
that participation and democracy are closely related. By justice, I 
don’t simply mean due process in disciplinary hearings—although 
that is an important component of a just workplace. I also mean the 
creation of a workplace where the fruits of one’s labor are fairly dis-
tributed. 
Given how I have defined these terms, autonomy and dignity 
are, in my view, foundational and the three other values can be de-
rived from autonomy and dignity. In other words, participation, de-
mocracy, and justice are desirable but not foundational values. I will 
not, however, prove that in this Article. Instead, to avoid argument 
with those who champion other values as foundational, I will pro-
ceed on the assumption that all five values are desirable for building 
a workplace grounded in human rights, leaving the meta-question 
for another day. 
2. THE LEGAL SOURCE OF WORKERS’ RIGHTS AS HUMAN RIGHTS 
As Professor James Gross correctly noted, “[t]he concept of hu-
man rights . . . has not been an important influence in the making of 
United States labor policy.”295 Yet, the U.S. Supreme Court early on 
recognized that workers’ rights secured under the National Labor 
Relations Act are “fundamental,” stating: 
[T]he [NLRA] . . . safeguard[s] the right of employ-
ees to self-organization and to select representatives 
of their own choosing for collective bargaining or 
other mutual protection without restraint or coercion 
by their employer. 
That is a fundamental right. Employees have as clear 
a right to organize and select their representatives for 
lawful purposes as the respondent has to organize its 
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business and select its own officers and agents. Dis-
crimination and coercion to prevent the free exercise 
of the right of employees to self-organization and 
representation is a proper subject for condemnation 
by competent legislative authority. Long ago we 
stated the reason for labor organizations. We said 
that they were organized out of the necessities of the 
situation; that a single employee was helpless in deal-
ing with an employer; that he was dependent ordinar-
ily on his daily wage for the maintenance of himself 
and family; that, if the employer refused to pay him 
the wages that he thought fair, he was nevertheless 
unable to leave the employ and resist arbitrary and 
unfair treatment; that union was essential to give la-
borers opportunity to deal on an equality with their 
employer.296 
The keystone of those fundamental rights, posited in NLRA Sec-
tion 7, is that employees possess “the right to self-organization, to 
form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively 
through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in con-
certed activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mu-
tual aid or protection . . . .”297 Were this a human right, then the 
source of that right, in my view, would not be positive legislative 
law, which could be enacted or repealed at the whim of the majority, 
but morality or some other source external to the positive law. 
Accordingly, the practical import of the Court’s declaration that 
Section 7 rights are “fundamental”298 is unclear. Perhaps the Court 
meant that those rights are foundational, that is, grounded in some 
value external to the positive law. Perhaps it meant that those rights 
are positive rights grounded in the basic values embedded in our 
Constitution, such as freedom of association.299 Or perhaps the 
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Court meant something else entirely. Unfortunately, the Court did 
not explain what it meant. 
Notwithstanding the Supreme Court’s observation that workers’ 
freedom to associate for the purposes of collective bargaining and 
mutual aid or protection is “fundamental,”300 the Court never ana-
lyzed the constitutionality of the NLRA with respect to the consti-
tutional right to freedom of association.301 Instead, it based its anal-
ysis on the breadth of Congress’s authority under the Commerce 
Clause to regulate commerce, including labor-management relations 
where Congress had determined that an inequality of bargaining 
power made illusory freedom of contract between certain forms of 
business organization and individual employees, which in turn 
caused economic disruptions to commerce.302 This analysis hardly 
presents a moral foundation for the law of the workplace, unless 
freedom to engage in economic activity is once again arrogated to 
that level. That explanation is exceedingly unlikely in this context, 
where the Court is disrupting the Lochner paradigm.303 
What we are left with are two findings. One, that Section 7 rights 
are fundamental. Two, that Congress has authority to enact laws to 
protect those rights under the Commerce Clause. The first lends 
moral legitimacy to the NLRA’s purpose; the second lends positive 
legitimacy. 
My point—that the validity of some laws and their basic foun-
dations reside in morality—is not without controversy. Indeed, 
many of the greatest legal philosophers of the twentieth century, in-
cluding Professors Hans Kelsen, H.L.A. Hart, and Joseph Raz are 
positivists who reject the argument that the law’s validity is based 
on a morality that is extrinsic to the law itself.304 So let me make a 
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 302 See Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. at 29–33. 
 303 See supra Section II.A. 
 304 See generally HART, supra note 241, at 227–29; KELSEN, supra note 247, 
at 1, 59–69; Hans Kelsen, The Pure Theory of Law and Analytical Jurisprudence, 
55 HARV. L. REV. 44, 44, 66–70 (1941); MORALITY OF FREEDOM, supra note 208, 
193–216. 
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thin version of this argument: even if the law is positive in nature, I 
am interested in what the law should be and therefore seek to find 
values to ground labor laws. In the thick version, I claim that only 
those labor laws that reflect these values are legitimate because only 
those labor laws are morally grounded by legitimate values. The 
trick is to find the legitimizing values. Are they autonomy, dignity, 
participation, democracy, and justice or are there some other values 
that should govern the workplace? 
I acknowledge that the legitimating source of the law will result 
in different policy consequences. Indeed, even the thin and thick 
versions of my argument will result in different policy conse-
quences. For example, if Section 7 is legitimate only if it promotes 
the autonomous dignified worker then administrative and judicial 
constructions of Section 7 must promote those values. By contrast, 
if Section 7 is legitimate if it promotes values underlying the Com-
merce Clause then administrative and judicial constructions are 
much more likely to take into consideration the value of industrial 
peace to prevent obstructions to commerce. To tie a bow on this 
point, I would also have to articulate the consequences of breaking 
legitimate laws. Are citizens morally permitted to break laws not 
grounded in legitimate values? If so, what form of civil disobedience 
is permissible? By contrast, if such laws are grounded in illegitimate 
values, are they even laws? These questions are not answered 
here.305 
B. The Rights-Based Workplace Model from the Workers’ Interests 
1. OVERVIEW 
In this section, I construct a rights-based model of the workplace 
derived from workers’ interests. To do this, I must, as a threshold 
matter, identify the claim-rights holders, in this case the workers; 
and the duty holders. For purposes of this paper, let’s assume that 
workers can claim duties from the following stakeholders: (1) em-
ployers; (2) owners of the factors of production; (3) businesses as 
artificial persons; (4) managers, supervisors, and other agents of the 
                                                                                                             
 305 See generally Civil Disobedience, supra note 279 (paper presented at the 
Ohio State Journal of Dispute Resolution’s Symposium: The Role of ADR Mech-
anisms in Public Sector Labor Disputes: What Is at Stake, Where We Can Im-
prove & How We Can Learn from the Private Sector (Feb. 17, 2012)). 
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employers, owners, and businesses; and (5) the government (and its 
agents), in cases where the workers are public employees. When 
talking about this duty-holder in a generic matter, I will often use 
the shorthand term, employer. Next, assuming that rights are based 
on interests and are grounded in values, I must identify the interests 
and foundational values of the opposing parties. I have already iden-
tified the desirable/foundational values of workers—autonomy, dig-
nity, participation, democracy, and justice. I accomplish the remain-
ing tasks in Section V.B.2, infra, where I also show the extent to 
which those interests are in conflict. I end this section by generating 
a rights-based workplace model. 
2. IDENTIFYING THE INTERESTS OF WORKERS AND EMPLOYERS AND 
THE VALUES REFLECTED IN THOSE INTERESTS 
As Congress identified in the NLRA, workers have interests in 
“wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment.”306 
Using that statutory phrase as a starting point to better understand 
workers’ interests, I examine the following concepts: job security, 
wages and benefits, hours, working conditions and work location, 
and training. 
i. Job Security 
Although job security is not specifically mentioned in the NLRA 
as an employee interest, it is the threshold interest.307 Without a job, 
the workers’ interest in wages, hours, and other terms and conditions 
of employment is meaningless. Job security means different things 
to different people in different cultures.308 As I have written else-
where, a right to job security as a procedural matter enforceable 
against the employer could range from at-will employment, which 
carries no job security and no procedures for securing or maintaining 
a job, to advance notice of job loss, to consultation over job loss, to 
bargaining over the effects of that job loss to bargaining over the 
                                                                                                             
 306 29 U.S.C. §158(d) (2012). 
 307 See generally id. 
 308 See generally Anne Marie Lofaso, Talking Is Worthwhile: The Role of Em-
ployee Voice in Protecting, Enhancing, and Encouraging Individual Rights to Job 
Security in a Collective System, 14 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 55, 88–91 (2010) 
[hereinafter Talking Is Worthwhile]. 
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decision to terminate, to just-cause termination, to co-deter-
mination.309 The spectrum might look something like this: 
A more substantive right to job security as enforceable against 
the state or an employer might mean a right to a particular job or a 
right to any job, but not a job of one’s choice.310 Recognizing, how-
ever, that neither governments nor employers can completely con-
trol the unemployment rate or rate of employment in a country, a 
particular business sector such as the industrial or manufacturing 
sectors, or even at a particular firm, a right to a job might have to be 
liquidated.311 Accordingly, it may not mean a right to a job at all but 
a right to income replacement in the likely event that the government 
or the employer cannot sustain a promise of full employment.312 In 
this case, the spectrum might look as follows: 
 
ii. “Wages, Hours, and Other Terms and Conditions of 
Employment” 
Over the past 75 years, the Board, with court approval, has 
fleshed out the statutory phrase “wages, hours, and other terms and 
conditions of employment.”313 The NLRB has broadly construed the 
                                                                                                             
 309 See id. at 63, 68–69. 
 310 See id. at 66–67. 
 311 See id. at 62–63, 66 n.49, 73–75; see generally A.C.S., Structural Unem-
ployment: Jobs for the Long Run, THE ECONOMIST (May 21, 2012, 9:01 PM), 
http://www.economist.com/blogs/freeexchange/2012/05/structural-unemploy-
ment. 
 312 See Talking Is Worthwhile, supra note 308, at 66–68. 
 313 29 U.S.C. § 158(d). 
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statutory term “wages” to include across-the-board wage in-
creases,314 merit increases,315 premium pay,316 commissions, bo-
nuses,317 severance pay,318 and benefits. Benefits include, for exam-
ple, pension plans,319 group health insurance plans,320 various fringe 
benefits,321 and disability leave.322 The Board has also broadly con-
strued the statutory term “hours,” stating: 
[T]he particular hours of the day and the particular 
days of the week during which employees shall be 
required to work are subjects well within the realm 
of ‘wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of 
employment’ about which employers and unions 
must bargain.323 
                                                                                                             
 314 See, e.g., N.L.R.B. v. Katz, 369 U.S. 736, 743–45 (1962). 
 315 See, e.g., J. H. Allison & Co., 70 N.L.R.B. 377, 377–78 (1946), enforced, 
165 F.2d 766, 771 (6th Cir. 1948). 
 316 See, e.g., B.P. Oil, Inc., 256 N.L.R.B. 1107, 1111 (1981), enforced, 681 
F.2d 804, 804 (3d Cir. 1982); Smith Cabinet Mfg. Co., Inc., 147 N.L.R.B. 1506, 
1507–08 (1964) (differential shift pay); Braswell Motor Freight Lines, Inc., 141 
N.L.R.B. 1154, 1160–64 (1963) (overtime pay). 
 317 See, e.g., N.L.R.B. v. Niles-Bement-Pond Co., 199 F.2d 713, 714 (2d Cir. 
1952) (Christmas bonuses); Singer Mfg. Co., 24 N.L.R.B. 444, 459–60 (1940), 
enforced, 119 F.2d 131, 136 (7th Cir. 1941) (same). 
 318 See, e,g., Champion Int’l Corp., 339 N.L.R.B. 672, 672 (2003). 
 319 See, e.g., Inland Steel Co., 77 N.L.R.B. 1, 2–4 (1948), enforced, 170 F.2d 
247, 251 (7th Cir. 1948); N.L.R.B. v. Black-Clawson Co., 210 F.2d 523, 524 (6th 
Cir. 1954) (per curiam) (profit-sharing retirement plans). 
 320 See, e.g., W.W. Cross & Co., Inc., 77 N.L.R.B. 1162, 1163–64 (1948), en-
forced, 174 F.2d 875, 877–78 (1st Cir. 1949) (group health and accident insur-
ance). 
 321 See, e.g., N.L.R.B. v. Katz, 369 U.S. 736, 739–744 (1962) (sick-leave pol-
icy); Singer Mfg. Co., 119 F.2d at 136. 
 322 See, e.g., N.L.R.B. v. Patent Trader, 415 F.2d 190, 198 (2d Cir. 1969), 
modified on other grounds, 426 F.2d 791 (2d Cir. 1970). 
 323 Local Union No. 189, Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Jewel Tea Co., Inc., 
381 U.S. 676, 691 (1965). 
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Hours of work might include, for example, the number of hours 
worked per day, per week, or per pay period;324 start, quit, and break 
times;325 work schedules and work shifts.326 
Other terms and conditions of employment range from the fun-
damental to the trivial. On a fundamental level, workers are inter-
ested in a workplace free from compulsory labor, free from child 
labor, and free from discrimination.327 As discussed above, these 
freedoms are so basic that the ILO has identified them as the funda-
mental rights, along with freedom of association.328 The next most 
basic term or condition of employment would concern one’s posi-
tion: the right to retain one’s current position,329 or the right not to 
be transferred to a job with more onerous working conditions.330 
Other vital terms and conditions of employment would also include 
all health and safety issues,331 privacy issues, and process issues.332 
Less vital, but of basic concern to modern workers, are issues sur-
rounding work location. This not only addresses geographical pref-
erences and commuting costs, but also such issues as flexiplace, tel-
ecommuting, work centers, and virtual workplaces.333 On the other 
                                                                                                             
 324 See id. See also George P. Pilling & Son Co., 16 N.L.R.B. 650, 651, 659 
(1939), enforced, 119 F.2d 32, 39 (3rd Cir. 1941) (unilaterally shortening hours). 
 325 See, e.g., Beverly Cal. Corp. v. N.L.R.B., 227 F.3d 817, 838 (7th Cir. 2000) 
(break times); Van Dorn Plastic Mach. Co., 286 N.L.R.B. 1233, 1239–40 (1987), 
enforced, 881 F.2d 302, 309 (6th Cir. 1989) (paid lunch period); Massey Gin & 
Mach. Works, Inc., 78 N.L.R.B. 189, 195, 199 (1948) (start and quit times); see 
also Verizon N.Y., Inc., 339 N.L.R.B. 30, 30–32 (2003) (time off to give blood). 
 326 See, e.g., Timken Roller Bearing Co., 70 N.L.R.B. 500, 515–18, 521 
(1946) (Saturday and Sunday work). 
 327 See supra Section IV.A.3. 
 328 See id. 
 329 See, e.g., Chambers Mfg. Corp., 124 N.L.R.B. 721, 723–25 (1959) (job 
classification—although General Counsel failed to sustain burden of showing that 
employer unilaterally changed job classifications). 
 330 See Bonham Cotton Mills, Inc., 121 N.L.R.B. 1235, 1236 (1958) (work-
load), enforced, 289 F.2d 903, 904 (5th Cir. 1961) (per curiam). 
 331 See, e.g., Johnson-Bateman Co., 295 N.L.R.B. 180, 182 (1989) (drug and 
alcohol testing of current employees who required medical treatment for on-the-
job injuries). 
 332 See generally Charles B. Craver, Privacy Issues Affecting Employers, Em-
ployees, and Labor Organizations, 66 LA. L. REV. 1057, 1068–75 (2006). 
 333 See generally Alex Felstiner, Working the Crowd: Employment and Labor 
Law in the Crowdsourcing Industry, 32 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 143, 182–
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end of the spectrum are the relatively minor working conditions such 
as the extent to which a worker may use the telephone or play the 
radio during working time.334 
iii. Training 
The concept of training returns us to the idea of job security. As 
explained above, governments are unlikely to be able to sustain a 
promise of full employment.335 Especially in a capitalist society, 
where capital is legally permitted to move around the country and 
even outside the country, the market plays a prominent role in the 
extent of employment and unemployment.336 Even in times of low 
unemployment rates, there is always going to be some frictional un-
employment—unemployment arising from market mismatch be-
tween workers and jobs, thereby resulting in a short period of time 
during which a worker is transitioning from school to job, from 
parenthood to job, or from job to job.337 There is also likely always 
to be some structural unemployment—involuntary unemployment 
arising primarily from mismatched labor supply and demand.338 In 
effect, structural unemployment results from a lack of demand for 
the labor available.339 Structural unemployment differs from fric-
tional unemployment insofar as structural unemployment tends not 
to be temporary and is much more difficult to address as a policy 
matter.340 For example, the technological displacement of workers 
results in structural unemployment, whereas the search time in be-
tween jobs results in frictional unemployment.341 
                                                                                                             
86 (2011) (outlining the difficulties in the application of the NLRA to modern 
working conditions). 
 334 See Hedison Mfg. Co., 249 N.L.R.B. 791, 796 (1980). 
 335 See generally Talking Is Worthwhile, supra note 308, at 66–68. 
 336 See generally A.C.S., supra note 311. 
 337 See Tim Worstall, US Jobless Claims Fall to Lowest Rate Ever – At Least 
Since Records Began, FORBES (Mar. 2, 2017), https://www.forbes.com/sites/tim-
worstall/2017/03/02/us-jobless-claims-fall-to-lowest-rate-ever-at-least-since-rec-
ords-began/#4a5bf57d4a7d. 
 338 See A.C.S., supra note 311. 
 339 See id. 
 340 See id. 
 341 For a basic explanation of structural unemployment, see id. 
2017] WORKERS' RIGHTS AS NATURAL HUMAN RIGHTS 635 
 
The following chart, taken from the U.S. Department of Labor’s 
Bureau of Labor Statistics,342 depicts the difference in job openings 
and unemployment rate in the U.S. over the past 16 years: 
 
This chart tells us that between December 2007 and late 2009, 
the U.S. was in a recession because the unemployment rate is high 
and job openings rate is low.343 During a period of expansion the 
converse would be true—low unemployment rate and high job 
openings rate.344 By contrast, in 2010 and 2011, each month’s point 
on the curved moved “up and to the left as the job openings rate 
                                                                                                             
 342 U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, JOB OPENINGS AND 
LABOR TURNOVER SURVEY HIGHLIGHTS 4 (2016), https://www.bls.gov/web/jolts
/jlt_labstatgraphs.pdf. 
 343 See id. 
 344 Id. 
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increased and the unemployment rate decreased.”345 This indicates 
an expanding economy during that time. 
The Beveridge Curve gives us insights into workers’ basic inter-
est in job security.346 Hypothetical rational workers will understand 
that their jobs may not always be available in a capitalist econ-
omy.347 Accordingly, it is in their interest to receive broad training 
so that they can more readily find work during periods of contrac-
tion. 
iv. Other Interests: The Search for Meaningful Work 
Workers’ have many more interests. I think of these as the search 
for meaningful work. Those interests range from receiving tasks to 
keep busy to creating a social outlet to performing assignments that 
links work to personal identity.348 
3. COMPARING WORKERS’ INTERESTS WITH EMPLOYERS’ 
INTERESTS 
As explained above, workers have several interests. Broadly 
speaking, we could characterize those interests as follows: job secu-
rity,349 living wages, good benefits, choice hours, work location 
flexibility, good working conditions, and generalized training. Table 
1 below shows how these interests conflict fundamentally with em-
ployers’ interests: 
 
Table 1. Comparison of Worker and Management Interests 
 
Labor Management 
1. Job security 1. Employment at-will  
2. Living wages & good bene-
fits 
2. Low costs/Profit maximiza-
tion/ High production/Efficient 
production 
3. Choice hours and work lo-
cation 
3. Property preservation/Moni-
tor employees for shirking 
                                                                                                             
 345 Id. 
 346 See id.; see also A.C.S., supra note 311. 
 347 See generally Talking Is Worthwhile, supra note 308, at 62–63, 66–68. 
 348 See generally Toward a Foundational Theory, supra note 49, at 39-40. 
 349 See Talking Is Worthwhile, supra note 308, at 58. 
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4.Good working conditions 4. Minimize liability 
5. Generalized training 5. Firm-specific training 
 
This table shows us the extent to which workers and firms have 
diametrically opposed interests. For example, whereas workers want 
job security, employers favor employment at-will at least in part to 
lower the cost of terminating employment.350 According to Profes-
sor Richard Epstein, the at-will employment doctrine should be 
maintained not only as a permissible contractual term, but also “as 
a rule of construction in response to the perennial question of gaps 
in contract language: what term should be implied in the absence of 
explicit agreement on the question of duration or grounds for termi-
nation?”351 Epstein defends the at-will employment doctrine on both 
human rights grounds—because it embodies “[f]reedom of contract 
[a]s an aspect of individual liberty”352—and economic grounds—
because it “represents in most contexts the efficient solution to the 
employment relation.”353 
It turns out that efficiency is often at the heart of the managerial 
interest.354 Employers prefer the at-will doctrine because it means 
that it can more inexpensively breach the so-called employment 
contract.355 Under the Kaldor-Hicks efficiency economic model, a 
transaction is more efficient if the breaching party remains better off 
after legally compensating the nonbreaching party.356 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                             
 350 See Toward a Foundational Theory, supra note 49, at 8. 
 351 Richard A. Epstein, In Defense of the Contract at Will, 51 UNIV. CHI. L. 
REV. 947, 951 (1984). 
 352 Id. at 953. 
 353 Id. at 951. 
 354 See Toward a Foundational Theory, supra note 49, at 8. 
 355 See id. 
 356 See id. 
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4. COMPARING AND EVALUATING THE VALUES UNDERLYING 
WORKERS’ AND EMPLOYERS’ INTERESTS 
Recall the five basic values underlying workers’ interests: 
1. Autonomy 
  . . . to become part-author of one’s working 
life.357 
2. Dignity 
 . . . to be treated as persons with independent 
moral worth.358 
3. Participation 
 . . . to participate in decisions affecting one’s 
work life.359 
4. Democracy 
 . . . to have an equal or substantial say in those 
decisions.360 
5. Justice 
 . . . to work in a workplace where termina-
tions are for cause and where the fruits of 
one’s labor are fairly distributed. 
i. Autonomy or Coercion? Participation or Unilateral Decision-
making? Democracy or Disloyalty? 
Whereas workers value their autonomy361—the capacity to be-
come part-author of their work lives—employers do not value work-
ers’ autonomy because, in their view, it interferes with the em-
                                                                                                             
 357 See id. at 38–49. 
 358 See id.at 49. 
 359 See id. at 40–42. 
 360 See id. 
 361 See id. at 40–42. 
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ployer’s autonomy to make unilateral decisions about the work-
place.362 In other words, employers value coercion of their employ-
ees—employers wish to control their employees and force them to 
behave in a certain manner without input for their workers. 
Seeing this from a different vantage point, employers do not 
value employee voice, for its own sake. To be sure, employers may 
and often do value employee input—information solicited or re-
ceived from their workers to help employers make decisions. Em-
ployers may also value worker reports—using workers as the em-
ployers’ “eyes and ears” to report misconduct or poor performance. 
Employers are not concerned, necessarily, with how that input af-
fects the worker’s autonomy or the worker’s voice. Along these 
lines, employers are not willing to surrender what they believe is 
theirs, the unilateral right to make production decisions, which by 
definition includes decisions that affect the worker’s work life. The 
reluctance to surrender that authority is, in this way, analogous to 
the reluctance of the king to surrender his decision-making authority 
to his subjects in the form of parliament, which incidentally derives 
from the Latin word, parlar, meaning to speak. It takes only a small 
additional step to see how asking for a voice in decision-making 
might be viewed as disloyalty to the firm or to the king. 
ii. Dignity or Factor of Production? 
Whereas workers want to be treated with the dignity that every 
person deserves merely for being human, firms treat workers as fac-
tors of production.363 This treatment, by definition, handles workers 
as instruments or means rather than ends in themselves. While com-
mon in economic analysis, managing workers as mere factors of 
production removes the humanity from workers, thereby dehuman-
izing them.364 
                                                                                                             
 362 See, e.g., Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1, 23 (1915). 
 363 See Walter Y. Oi, Labor as a Quasi-Fixed Factor, 70 J. OF POL. ECON. 538, 
539 (1962). 
 364 See Bekah Mandell, Putting Theory into Practice: Using a Human Rights 
Framework and Grassroots Organizing to Build a National Revolutionary Move-
ment, 1 COLUM. J. RACE & L. 402, 407 (2012). 
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iii. Justice or Efficiency/Productivity/Wealth Maximization? 
Workers want both procedural and substantive justice.365 For ex-
ample, in the case of a discharge, they want to know that they will 
be treated fairly.366 They also want to know that the fruits of their 
labor are distributed fairly.367 This desire is at odds with the employ-
ers’ desire to maximize profits, which means cutting costs and/or 
increasing revenues.368 Firms can cut costs by lowering wages, lay-
ing off workers, denying benefits, cutting hours—all actions that 
would negatively impact employees.369 Firms can also increase rev-
enues by increasing productivity.370 Productivity gains might be re-
alized through mechanization, which means labor layoffs, or it could 
be accomplished by making labor work harder. These are all means 
by which employers and employees essentially fight over the distri-
bution of the wealth that they have jointly created. Table 2. summa-
rizes this discussion: 
Table 2. Values at Odds 
 
Union Management 
Autonomy Coercion 
Dignity Labor – a factor of production 
Participation Unilateral decision-making 
Democracy Loyalty to the firm 
Justice Efficiency/Productivity/Wealth 
Maximization 
 
Notwithstanding these conflicts, there is one interest that both 
parties have in common—that is, the firm’s financial well-being.371 
Workers’ value the firm’s financial well-being because the firm is 
                                                                                                             
 365 See generally Robert C. Dailey & Delaney J. Kirk, Distributive and Pro-
cedural Justice as Antecedents of Job Dissatisfaction and Intent to Turnover, 45 
HUM. REL. 305, 307–08 (1992). 
 366 See id. 
 367 See id. 
 368 See Truman F. Bewley, Why Not Cut Pay?, 42 EUR. ECON. REV. 459, 478–
79 (1998). 
 369 See id. 
 370 See generally George N. Root III, Factors to Increase Productivity, 
CHRON, http://smallbusiness.chron.com/factors-improve-productivity-1229.html 
(last visited Mar. 9, 2017). 
 371 See generally Talking Is Worthwhile, supra note 308, at 74. 
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their source of job security and income. Employers value it because 
the firm is their source of profit and wealth. The parties disagree on 
one fundamental point, however; how the wealth, which is the prod-
uct of labor and capital working together, should be distributed.372 
VII. CONCLUSION 
A. Summary 
In the context of an increasingly polarized U.S. electorate, there 
has been a backlash against workplace regulations that had previ-
ously raised the floor of rights upon which workers engage. Clever 
employers have ascertained how to evade work regulations by ask-
ing courts, administrative agencies, and legislative bodies to narrow 
the definitions of employee and employer. This current trend toward 
workplace fragmentation, which is not limited to the U.S. but which 
has also infected other legal systems such as that of the European 
Union, often comes in the form of outsourcing even core jobs result-
ing in legal problems for fringe workers (e.g., part-time workers, 
independent contractors). For example, workers who are independ-
ent contractors are not statutory employees under the NLRA and 
therefore are not protected for purposes of that law regardless of the 
economic realities of the employer-employee relationship or the 
economic realities that make them dependent on “their” employers. 
This legal landscape has resulted in a workforce in which many 
workers are no longer tied to a particular employer. These individu-
als have consequently lost their statutory and other legal protections 
simply because they do not fit the regulatory or common law defi-
nition of employee. In effect, there is no employer on which to place 
a legal duty to protect. 
In this Article, I argue that a human rights approach to work reg-
ulations could remedy this problem. If workers’ rights no longer de-
pended on workers’ status as employees of a particular employer, 
but instead attached to workers simply because they engaged in 
work, this could place a duty on the state to ensure that someone is 
a duty holder—most likely, the business that benefits from their 
work, the state, or a third-party beneficiary. In such circumstances, 
                                                                                                             
 372 See generally Toward a Foundational Theory, supra note 49, at 25–26. 
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a human rights approach to workers’ rights would remedy the no-
duty-holder problem. I call this concept “the worker as citizen. 
In this Article, I have taken a six-step analytical approach to an-
alyze the question whether a human rights approach would help 
solve some of these problems (in particular, the no-duty-holder 
problem373) and what a human rights approach might look like. In 
step one,374 I took a historical approach to understanding the labor 
law model that is dominant in the U.S.—a model that is filtered 
through a free market economic ideology. Although the New Deal 
Keynesian economic model temporarily disrupted this model, the 
free market has now returned in the form of neo-liberal law and eco-
nomics. The clash of these two world views is, as Joseph Stiglitz has 
written, “the nightmare towards which we are slowly marching.”375 
In step two,376 I explored T.H. Marshall’s concept of citizenship. 
An account of labor law where the worker is essentially a full citizen 
regardless of his or her legal status (e.g., statutory employee, inde-
pendent contractor, migrant worker) helps combat the no-duty-
holder problem (identified above). Using Marshall’s framework to 
explain that full citizens possess political, civil, and social rights, I 
point out that workers’ rights do not fit neatly into Marshall’s rubric 
not only because they are socio-economic rights, but also because 
they cut across these and other categories. I conclude that Marshall’s 
model is only a partial solution, albeit a step in the right direction. 
In step three,377 building on Marshall’s rubric, I created a frame-
work for evaluating workplace laws based on the worker as a citizen 
of the labor force who has human rights. I do this using two meth-
odologies: comparative legal analysis and jurisprudential analysis. 
First, I describe international labor standards, as articulated in basic 
human rights instruments, and compare them to fundamental U.S. 
laws. I conclude that U.S. laws fare well in such a comparison, at 
least at a superficial level. This analysis is essentially a comparison 
between the positive international law and the positive national law. 
Second, I deconstruct the terms “human” and “rights.”378 Drawing 
                                                                                                             
 373 See supra Part I. 
 374 See supra Part II. 
 375 See STIGLITZ, supra note 1, at 289. 
 376 See supra Part III. 
 377 See supra Part IV. 
 378 See supra Part IV.B. 
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primarily on the philosophical theories of Immanual Kant (dignity), 
Ronald Dworkin (dignity), and Raz (autonomy), and also the rights 
theories of Joseph Raz and Wesley Hohfeld (that rights are based on 
interests and grounded in values), I draw two conclusions. First, hu-
man rights must be grounded in at least two values—autonomy and 
dignity. Second, human rights are greater than adding what makes 
us human together with what makes a right. 
In step four,379 I modify Rawls’s famous thought experiment to 
show that a workplace grounded in autonomy and dignity is a just 
model. In this modified original position, which I call the empathic 
position, the participants remain ignorant about their own particular 
characteristics, but could and would be able to know what it would 
be like to live the life of every type of person —every race, ethnicity, 
gender, sexual orientation, and class—to name but a few character-
istics. Accordingly, those in the modified original position could 
empathize with all. Using a veil of empathy rather than the veil of 
ignorance as the defining feature of those in the original position 
helps move forward the conversation regarding workers’ rights be-
cause it forces us to account for all viewpoints when making policy 
choices. 
While this paper centers on the autonomous dignified worker, it 
also adopts a theoretical framework that is sensitive to power: the 
relative power of labor and capital, and the relative power of gov-
ernment and capital. Such a framework, with a focus on collectives 
and institutions, supplements the somewhat liberal individualist val-
ues of autonomy and dignity. Recognizing this dynamic, I created a 
fifth step,380 where I apply this human rights framework to the work-
place to show that employers’ and employees’ interests conflict at 
the foundational level. Accordingly, employers and employees 
struggle within this power-relationship. In the political arena, the re-
sulting conflict leads to gridlock between those who believe that 
promoting employers’ interests will result in the more liberated, and 
therefore better, society, and those who believe that promoting 
workers’ interests will create a more just, and therefore better, soci-
ety. I show that the point of greatest conflict is not on the financial 
well-being of the firm (in which both labor and management/owners 
have an interest), but on how the wealth created by labor and capital 
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 380 See supra Part VI. 
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working together should be distributed. Accordingly, in a society 
governed by free market principles, employers are incentivized to 
diminish their duties to workers arising in part out of their own self-
ish interests. Firms are simply not internally motivated to consider 
the positions of others. The law, or at least something external to the 
firms’ economic interests, must incentivize firms to view their work-
ers not merely as factors of production, but as human beings. Mod-
ern western democracies based on liberal principles and grounded 
in libertarian economic theory are more likely to create grave injus-
tices for those who possess neither economic nor political power. 
The empathic position resets these tendencies, showing what kind 
of society we should try to construct, with regard to everyone’s in-
terests. 
B. Final Thoughts 
This paper leaves open several questions. First, to what extent, 
if any, must the sovereign ground the workplace in worker auton-
omy and dignity to be legitimate? Second, to what extent, if any, 
may workers engage in civil disobedience to protest illegitimate 
work rules? Third, what is the relationship between the positive-
right standard and the natural-right used for comparing and as-
sessing U.S. labor laws? 
All three questions are related and relate to one of my future re-
search projects. In my view, if workplaces are governed by rules that 
drift too far from significant values, then those workplaces are ille-
gitimate. In such cases, workers are entitled to break such rules, in 
much the same way that the civil disobedient is entitled to break 
laws to protest unjust law and to communicate those views to the 
public. The trick here is to understand the relationship between those 
rules (positive law) and what might be natural laws grounded in 
workplace values. Those in the modified original position will gen-
erate those natural values as autonomy, dignity, participation, de-
mocracy and justice and thus harmonize the City of God with the 
City of man.381 Just how that will happen is the subject of my next 
article on this subject. 
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